UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUITY IN GERMAN HISTORY: FROM HANS-ULRICH WEHLER'S *DAS DEUTSCHE KAISERREICH 1871-1918* TO THE *HISTORIKERSTREIT*

BY

STEVEN THOMAS KARP

©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1992

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-77340-5

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: STEVEN THOMAS KARP

TITLE OF THESIS: THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUITY IN GERMAN HISTORY: FROM HANS-ULRICH WEHLER'S *DAS DEUTSCHE KAISERREICH 1871-1918* TO THE *HISTORIKERSTREIT*

DEGREE: MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: FALL 1992

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.

Steven Thomas Karp

Steven Thomas Karp

14004 - 109 B Avenue

Edmonton, Alberta T5M 2K8

8.X.92

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the formulation and development of the concept of historical continuity in German historiography from the 1973 publication of Hans-Ulrich Wehler's *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* to the *Historikerstreit* of the late 1980s. For German historiography, the problem of historical continuity refers to the attempt to fit the years of National Socialism (1933-1945) into the fabric of German history from the unification of Germany under Bismarck in 1871 down to the present. Hans-Ulrich Wehler champions widening--or shifting--the paradigm of German historiography to include social history (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*) rather than continuing to write from traditional perspectives. The thesis examines the concept of historical continuity from a perspective of practical application rather than metaphysics. Historical continuity is seen as a professional construct of the historian and therefore is as much contingent upon following conventional rules of logic and chronological sequence as it is upon the historiographic paradigm developed within the historical profession in Germany. Furthermore, the formulation of historical continuity reflects a desire of the part of practising historians to advance and perpetuate the particular historiographic paradigm in which they and their students operate. The formulation and development of historical continuity in Germany also has been influenced by the political affiliation of German historians and their attitudes towards the sources of legitimization of the German State.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Concept of Continuity in German History: From Hans-Ulrich Wehler's *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* to the *Historikerstreit*" submitted by Steven Thomas Karp in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Helen Liebel-Weckowicz

Ulrich Trumpener

Gerwin Marahrens

David C. Johnson

7 October 1992

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....1

Chapter One: A Discussion of Historical Continuiuity.....6

Chapter Two: Hans-Ulrich Wehler: *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* and Continuity in German History.....33

Chapter Three: The *Historikerstreit*: Singularity or Comparability, Continuity or Discontinuity, and *Geschichtsbewußtsein*.....75

Conclusion.....113

Bibliography.....116

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the concepts of historical continuity and discontinuity in the light of the writing of German history since the 1973 publication of Hans-Ulrich Wehler's *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*. The thesis is divided into three chapters: Chapter 1 deals with continuity as a historical concept; Chapter 2 deals with Wehler's book and his approach to the writing of history and also several critiques of both the book as well as Wehler's approach; Chapter 3 deals with the German historians' dispute (*Historikerstreit*) regarding continuity and methodologies in approaching the writing of German history.

Chapter 1 deals more with historical continuity than its conceptual counterpart, discontinuity. The concept of historical continuity is related both to coherence and to sequence in history, and causality is associated with both coherence and sequence. Historical continuity, furthermore, is a construct of the historian, and is a function of the value system of the historian who is doing the writing of a particular history. Historical continuity can also refer to the continuity of a particular historical tradition in which either an individual historian or a school approaches the writing of history. The construction of a valid sequence of historical continuity is more dependent upon avoiding basic errors in logic as well as using some common place practices, for example, maintaining a correct temporal sequence, comparing similar things in the construction of continuity, and establishing a proper proportional scale of both time and analysis

so that discontinuity is not smoothed into continuity nor continuity broken up into discontinuity.

Chapter 2 deals with historical continuity in the writing of German history in the light of both Wehler's *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* and his approach to history--an approach which is termed "societal history" (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*)--as well as critiques of the book and his approach. Wehler's intention was to write "emancipatory history" by concentrating on economic and structural relationships in the period of 1871-1918, and thus show how there is a continuity in German history from this period to the era of National Socialism (1933-1945) and even to the founding of the West German State. As an exponent of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, Wehler wanted to both vindicate and validate this approach to the writing of German history by concentrating on the "primacy of domestic policy." Wehler approached the writing of German history from this point of view in order to explicitly challenge what he maintained was the paradigm in the writing of German history: the "primacy of foreign policy." His challenge also was an assault upon the dominance in the historical profession itself of this paradigm. To achieve what was, in effect, a paradigm shift in German historiography would reinforce and further open positions in faculties of history in Germany for those who were following a *gesellschaftsgeschichtlich* approach to the writing of history.

Since Wehler approached his topic with an explicit political agenda, it was not surprising that some of the criticism which was directed at both his book and his historiographic approach was political as well as methodological. On a theoretical level, Thomas Nipperdey

directed the major and most serious methodological criticism against Wehler. Nipperdey insisted that one might best view German history from 1871 to 1933 as consisting of a series of continuities which were radically reformed in 1933 rather than just being conceived of as a monolithic and uniform continuum. Nipperdey also asserted that to work backward from the present to filter even the *Kaiserreich* through the spectrum of 1933, is to approach history teleologically, which in turn distorts both the continuities as well as the discontinuities of German history. For Nipperdey, the writing of history should reflect the temporal process of history itself, in which the arrow of time moves forward and the future remains open to different possibilities.

Chapter 3 deals with the *Historikerstreit*, which was a battle over both continuity and historical consciousness (*Geschichtsbewußtsein*) in German history as they related both to the political situation in Germany in 1986 and how Germany viewed itself in relation to 1933. Rather than being driven by theoretical or methodological considerations, the historians' arguments were driven by partisan political considerations. To no small degree, the controversy pitted those who had aligned themselves with the dominant paradigm of the "primacy of foreign policy" against Wehler and those associated with an economic and structural approach to the writing of history. This controversy seemed to have reached maximum intensity in about 1987-88, since when, apparently, it has been superseded by the unification of Germany.

The concepts of continuity and discontinuity--or continuities and discontinuities--in German history have been broadened through the use

of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. Continuities in German history, moreover, have not been approached from a dispassionate, scholarly viewpoint. The very construction of historical continuity is a value-laden process, and the parameters of its valid construction depend upon the constraints of logic and structure. While adhering to the principles of logic and structure, the attempts to formulate a picture of historical continuity in Germany have been driven by partisan political considerations which have been oriented towards the political foundations of the West German state. Moreover, the traditional post-War German approach to historical continuity also has been seen as perpetuating that methodological approach to history and validating that approach in the historians' guild associated with the most prestigious chairs in history in West Germany. The challenge to the traditional approach has been a challenge to both methodology and also to increasing the academic positions available to those advocating a broader approach to the writing of history in Germany. The absorption of East Germany into a unified German state will present new problems for the concept of historical continuity in German historiography. One can only assume that if past practice is any indication of future performance, political considerations will also play a large part in the future construction of historical continuity in the new Germany.

The time frame considered by this thesis begins in 1973, since Wehler's work was considered to epitomize the *gesellschaftsgeschichtlich* approach to German history. Within Germany, previous works which had considered historical continuity were written from a more traditional methodological point of view. For example, while Fritz Fischer's

Germany's Aims in the First World War was very controversial in regard to continuity in German history, it was still historical continuity as written from a traditional perspective. Furthermore, Wehler asserted that *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* was an attack on the guild mentality of German historians and their advocacy of *Historismus* and their writing history from the perspective of the "primacy of foreign policy." Thus, Wehler challenged continuity within the historical profession itself.

As explained in Chapter 3, this thesis concentrates on what has been historiography within West Germany alone. Historians writing in East Germany had operated within a Marxist-Leninist framework, and saw the East German state as being continuous only with those elements in the German past which might have been considered to be socially "progressive." In this thesis, whenever I refer to West Germany I have just used Germany.

The author's interest in the problem of the concept of historical continuity and German history began in the writing of a seminar paper on Friedrich Meinecke for Professor Helen Liebel-Weckowicz. Thanks are due not only to her, but to those other Professors who saw various parts of this thesis in their classes and seminars: Rod Macleod, David Johnson, Ulrich Trumpener, and Ronald Hamowy, as well as to Julian Martin, who read the thesis. All failures of both omission and commission are still the responsibility of the author.

Chapter 1

A Discussion of Historical Continuity

In modern German history, the problem of continuity--or, the continuity problem--refers to the efforts to establish the relationship of German history from the years surrounding German unification under Bismarck in 1871 to the years of National Socialist rule, 1933-1945. Closely related to the problem of continuity is the question of continuity's conceptual counterpart, discontinuity. Within German historiography, the debate has centred around the degree(s) of continuity and discontinuity in the elements which constitute German history. The problem of continuity, moreover, embraces the concept of historical continuity within the historians' guild as well as the presuppositions which the historians have used in writing about German history in this period.[1]

For the most part, discussions of historical continuity have centred on the theory of continuity *per se* and have had more of a metaphysical orientation than a practical orientation.[2] One finds that in Gardiner's two anthologies on the theory and philosophy of history, that not only are there no articles on historical continuity but there are no references to continuity in the indices.[3] In a similar work edited by William Dray, the only article on continuity is Michael Oakeshott's "Historical Continuity and Causal Analysis." Oakeshott

opined that what the "principle of mechanism is in scientific explanation, the principle of unity or continuity is in historical experience"; however, he did not examine the context in which continuity itself was developed.[4] The thrust of this chapter is to show that while continuity is a given in history, there are some broad rules which establish its validity (practicality versus metaphysics); furthermore, even though continuity is a given, the formulation of continuity related to a particular historical constellation of events has usually occurred within a group of historians which shared a particular historiographical tradition.

Historical continuity has been and is accepted as a given, if not an almost unquestioned presupposition in the writing of history. For example, in his *Grundriß*, Johann Gustav Droysen wrote that while the "field of historical method is the cosmos of the moral world," which in turn is the creation of humanity, "without a consciousness of continuity, without history," this work of humanity would be "a barren sand dune and an empty breeze."[5] A similar sentiment is reflected in the following: "The first thing to note about history, then, is that it has its origin in man's awareness of continuity."[6] Historical continuity has been described as an inherent "theme" in the writing of virtually any kind of history, except for "simple minded chronicles and listings."[7] Lying behind even so-called "simple minded chronicles," however, are coherent principles of selection and ordering which give rise to historical continuity.[8] The very idea of the medieval chronicle grew out of the idea of "describing how God worked in time."[9] This, in turn, was predicated upon the conceptualization of history in

the Old Testament, in which "a privileged line of events represented and signified the continuous intervention of God in the world which he had created."[10]

There are, however, several different kinds of continuities in evidence in this Old Testament conceptualization of history. Firstly, "the historical section of the Bible is a continuous narration from the creation of the world to about 400 B.C."[11] Secondly, it means that the narrative was a matrix which was constructed according to principles of selection which imposed a coherence upon the events so that the divine would be seen to be manifested. Thirdly, it means that the writers themselves were part of a continuous tradition which accepted common principles of selection, organization, and interpretation.[12] Even though "the motivations behind the canonical process were diverse and seldom discussed in the biblical text," the idea of an authoritative and active tradition which lay claims upon future generations of scribes was mentioned.[13] The process was not continuous in the sense that everyone at all times agreed on everything, but it was continuous in that those who wrote and shaped the scriptural canon wrote within a community that agreed on the principles that the divine interacted in history, that the text bore witness in a concrete historical manner to that interaction, and that the interaction was an ongoing historical phenomenon. Here one can see a continuity of events which in turn was shaped by a continuity in selection and organization and a continuity in the community of scribes. By contrast, Emil Brunner, a Protestant scholar writing in the 1920s in Switzerland, saw historical continuity within the scriptures as something created by the modern scholar who brought to the texts a

continuity shaped around a "natural-human analogical" continuum which would illuminate references which would otherwise have been hidden in a mere spatio-temporal continuum.[14] This approach, however, concentrated more on what the modern scholar brought to the texts in retrospection rather than dealing with the continuity in the texts themselves and the communities which shaped those texts.

Historical continuity can be either simple or complex. If all that is meant by historical continuity is that connections exist "between events that occur in temporal sequence," then "to claim that continuity in this formal sense is a basic postulate of historical methodology is as harmless as it is trite."[15] At this level of analysis, historical continuity is a postulate which is taken for granted. However, when one speaks about the nature of the connections which exist between the events that occur in a temporal sequence, or, in other words, the coherence between events, then continuity becomes complex. One may speak about a continuity problem when the coherence of a particular segment of history is questioned. "With the concept of historical continuity, the question is asked concerning the possibility and requirements of the coherence of history. Its use characterizes an historical situation in which the coherence from the past and present has been in question."[16]

"Sequence" and "coherence" are two words which are associated with the Greek and Latin words for "continuity." Sequence denotes the ordering of one thing after another and coherence refers to those things which are ordered in a meaningful relationship. Both the Greek (*συνεχια* and *συνεχης*) and the Latin (*continuatus*, *continuitas*, and *continuo*)

words for continuity share some of the same meanings. In both, for example, space and time are described as being continuous in the sense of being uninterrupted, unintermitting, or without interval. Of things in a series, continuity can denote coherence, connectiveness, or a chain of cause and effect.[17]

The German *Kontinuität* is derived from the Latin *continuitum*. Synonyms for Kontinuität are *Fortdauer, Stetigkeit*, and *lückenloser Zusammenhang*. In German, as in Greek and Latin, continuity is associated with the uninterruptedness, connectiveness, and coherence of an ordered unfolding. For example, in the index to a 1977 edition of Droysen's *Historik*, *Zusammenhang* is the cross-reference for *Kontinuität*. Also, in the index to Krieger's study of Ranke, instead of having any direct reference to "continuity," the cross-reference is to "coherence," and synonyms for "coherence" are: "connection, connectedness, continuity, and unity."[18]

In practice, what has been behind any discussion of the "coherence from the past to the present," has been the stated or unstated dissatisfaction with the results that have arisen from either the presence or absence of coherence associated with a particular series of events. In Ritter's *Dictionary of Concepts in History*, continuity in history was subsumed under "Periodization in History," and according to Ritter discussions regarding continuity in history have been conducted for the most part by German medievalists, in particular, Alfons Dopsch, an Austrian, and Hermann Aubin, a German.[19] Even though Ritter's reference is correct, it was an extremely limited view of the debate about historical continuity. Interestingly enough, the debate was not

mentioned either by Iggers in his survey of German historiography, *The Conception of German History*, or by Srbik in his second volume of *Geist und Geschichte*.[20]

The discussion about whether the transition from late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages was continuous or discontinuous began at the end of the First World War and the defeat of the German and Hapsburg Empires. It was a time of the rise of a "biological-cultural morphology," which attempted to explain the "rise, bloom, fall, and decline" of "civilization [*Kultur*]," an explanation which was exemplified in Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* (although the reference to Spengler's work only referred to the *Zeitgeist* and not to the scholarship).[21] Even though political history was the dominant approach towards the writing of history during this period of time in Germany, social history was used by German medievalists in pursuing the question of historical continuity. According to Faulenbach, some of the concepts which were discussed were the history of the land (*Landesgeschichte*), the history of settlements (*Siedlungsgeschichte*), population history (*Bevölkerungsgeschichte*), and folk art (*Volkskunde*). Although Aubin had been editor of the *Vierteljahresschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* from 1926 to 1967 (the publication began in 1903), the idea of *Sozialgeschichte* was a special discipline and did not impinge on what today would be called *Gesellschafts-geschichte* and the *gesellschaftsgeschichtlich* approach to the writing of political history.[22]

On the one hand, the Austrian economic historian, Alfons Dopsch, maintained that there was no coherence between Roman and German culture,

and on the other hand, the German medievalist, Hermann Aubin, maintained that such a coherence existed.[23] It would appear that both Dopsch and Aubin wrote about historical continuity and discontinuity as if these were monolithic, overarching concepts which applied to the transition between late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages as a whole rather than writing about continuities or discontinuities in discrete, individual areas. Even though Dopsch more than Aubin in effect wrote about continuities or discontinuities in individual areas, for the most part both of them wrote as if they were describing an either/or situation rather than a both/and situation.[24] Dopsch's point in writing about discontinuity was to stress the continuity which existed in the development of the German people apart from Roman influence while Aubin wrote about continuity in order to stress that the development of the German people included the heritage of the Roman and classical world.

In part, when one considers what elements are necessary in order to construct a valid historical continuity, one may turn to Alexander Gerschenkron's essay, "On the Concept of Continuity in History." Gerschenkron was trained in economic history in Austria and only left for the United States in 1938.[25] Even though he was an economic historian whose primary concern was to look at continuity in terms of business cycles, his examples were drawn from such diverse fields as mathematics, philosophy, and history (especially European history). Furthermore, Hans-Ulrich Wehler referred to Gerschenkron as one of those whose historical arguments helped him understand pre-industrialist and industrial economies.[26]

Gerschenkron's concern was to "formulate a concept of continuity

and discontinuity which is primarily historical rather than mathematical or metaphysical in nature."[27] From a practical standpoint, Gerschenkron wanted to look at how one might evaluate whether a series of events was continuous or discontinuous. To this end, he looked at five elements which he felt related directly to historical change and which addressed the problem of mensuration while avoiding "the metaphysical paint of inevitability." Gerschenkron's five elements were: "(a) constancy of direction; (b) periodicity of events; (c) endogenous change; (d) length of causal regress; [and,] (e) stability of the rate of change."[28] All five elements of historical change are related to each other; furthermore, they are related in the causal sense of having been crafted by the hand of an historian who "creates continuities or discontinuities . . . by abstracting from the differences and by concentrating on the similarities."[29]

This process of abstraction and comparison is not worked out in some kind of theoretical framework divorced from reality. The historian brings to bear on a particular problem the tools of the historical profession, for example, the investigation and weighing of sources, the logic of analysis and narrative, the criteria of selection for the events to be analyzed, and so forth. Moreover, in arriving at a valid historical reconstruction, there is an interplay between the historian's own approach to the subject matter and the methodology which is used. All of Gerschenkron's five factors depend on this interplay between an objective set of events and a subjective arrangement and interpretation.

In Gerschenkron's scheme, constancy of direction has more to do with the notion of progress than it does with temporal direction; where

there is regress rather than progress, one may speak about discontinuity.[30] At times, since one can note that there is regress, one can speak about a periodicity of events. Periodicity in history must be treated with care, since one must avoid the extremes, such as depicting history either as a "neo-Kantian . . . succession of specific and individual events" or depicting it in the manner of "Schopenhauer's monotonous parade of human bodies which are born, grow, decay, and die as the earth continues on its diurnal and annual rotations."[31] The interplay between data and the historian's skill in analysis and arrangement are shown in the question of periodicity, where the historian must find the delicate balance between "similarities amidst the differences, [and] of recurrences amidst the novelties."[32] The historian's analytic and conceptual skills are challenged in determining the manageable length(s) of the period(s) under investigation.

The determination of endogenous change takes place within the parameters established by periodicity of events and constancy of direction, but at the same time it also assists in establishing those parameters. It would appear that endogenous change refers back to "the similarities amidst the differences" since Gerschenkron defined endogenous change as that which is "described in terms of a homogeneous set of factors." In constructing a model of historical continuity, the historian exercises a "qualitative judgment" in the determination of what factors are or are not endogenous. Within this model, exogenous factors would indicate discontinuity. Working in economic history, Gerschenkron wrote that an example of an exogenous factor would be entrepreneurial innovation in the business cycle since this innovation

was based on "biological or psychological or other factors" which were "alien to the economic factor in terms of which the preinnovational and postinnovational situations are dealt with."[33] In this regard, as well as some of the following examples, Wehler posits that a theoretical framework is necessary in order to establish some kind of meaningful selection criteria.[34]

The length of causal regress and periodicity are closely related, however, causal regress is the concept (or set) under which periodicity of events is subsumed. In discussing the business cycle, for example, one might find two similar events separated by a hiatus but still be part of the same business cycle. Similar but separated events might be periodicities, yet these occur within a cycle which is viewed in terms of one causal regress. The historian sets about determining the origin of the causal chain, "to make the selection plausible in terms of the specific strength of the causal chain that is attached, link by link, to the 'original' cause." Within this theoretical scheme, however, Gerschenkron noted that "the concept of discontinuity eluded our search."[35]

For the most part, Gerschenkron's discussion of the stability of the rate of change was dependent upon examples drawn from economic history, from the area of "societal statistics." This reference to economic history and a subsequent reference to economic cycles is consistent with Wehler's *gesellschaftgeschichtlich* approach to history, in which Wehler attempts to construct a history which will connect the so-called uniquely political with such longer term horizons as the Kondratieff cycle.[36] Broadly speaking, from an historical

perspective, a low rate of change is most often associated with stability of the rate of change, while, "*per contra*, the concept of discontinuity may be similarly restricted to the case of an increase in the rate of change from the previously maintained low level."[37] The determination of what constitutes a low rate of change or a high rate of change must be within the historical context of the material being examined. Even though Gerschenkron's examples are economic in nature (i.e., industrial development in Europe), it is important to note that "any curve can be 'smoothed' by the use of an appropriate technique in such a way as to eliminate any sign of discontinuity."[38] It goes without saying that, on the one hand, if continuity can be created by choosing the appropriate mensuration scale in order to eliminate discontinuity by means of smoothing the scale, then, on the other hand, discontinuity can be created in the place of continuity through choosing a scale which will emphasize unevenness rather than smoothness.

Gerschenkron's observations on historical continuity, however, do not completely address the problem of the logic which would govern the construction of a valid representation of historical continuity. According to Jörn Rüsen, "narrative constitutes historical consciousness," in which continuity mediates the "inner coherence" of the past, present, and future.[39] In the "Introduction" to *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*, Hans-Ulrich Wehler argued that writing a history of this period was "no longer possible . . . in a conventional narrative style," since it would perpetuate out-of-date points of view.[40] Wehler, however, did not want to eliminate narrative, he merely wanted to broaden it to include analysis, and thus emerge with an analytic

narrative, so to speak, which would include the insights from economics, sociology, and so forth. As the debate developed over Wehler's approach to history, Wehler specifically maintained that "to assert a sharp dichotomy of theoretically oriented action and narrative leads to an unproductive, rigorous polarization."[41]

To look at the logic behind a narrative--or, analytic narrative--of historical continuity, one might turn to the work of an American historian, David Fischer's *Historians' Fallacies*.[42] For Fischer, the Earl Warren Professor of History at Brandeis University, history is more of a case of problem solving rather than story telling, although "the solution [sometimes] takes the form of a story."[43] Two chapters which are relevant to our topic are "Fallacies of Narration" (Chapter 5) and "Fallacies of Causation" (Chapter 6), both of which comprise a portion of Part II, "Explanation." Historical narrative, which is a vehicle for historical continuity, is bound by time and place; it is a story which "explains how and what--but not why." Fischer went on and wrote that an explanation need not give the "why" in order to remain a valid explanation, but could be valid in the sense of being that which is "to make clear, plain, and understandable."[44]

Fallacies of narration can be grouped into two categories; fallacies of anachronism and fallacies of change (the latter is not Fischer's terminology). Probably the most common form of anachronism is describing or analyzing an event in the past with terms contemporary with the author but foreign to the events in the past. Closely related to this, is the fallacy of presentism, or *nunc pro tunc*, in which "the antecedent in a narrative series is falsified by being defined or

interpreted in terms of its consequent."[45] An example of presentism is to be seen in Karl Buchheim's description of William II's speech on Bismarck's birthday in 1888:

> William called the Chancellor the standard bearer of the Reich, "from whom we expect all things." He exclaimed, "Let him go forward, we will follow him!" We note with horror the similarity between these words and the Hitlerite slogan, "Führer command, we follow!" Thus we see the fateful continuity of autocracy.[46]

In this illustration, Buchheim has defined the experience of 1888 in the terms of 1933; thus, in the complex series of events which occurred between 1888 and 1933, the focus is on those events which bore fruit in 1933 to the exclusion of those which did not. This does not mean that one cannot employ "retrospective symmetry," but any view of the past must be balanced lest the story be falsified by presentism. Similar to presentism is the fallacy of tunnel vision, in which history is reduced to a single theme, for example, political history, social history, ethical history, and so forth.

Fallacies of change are closely related to anachronism and deal with a false sense of the unfolding of time. This is closely related to Gerschenkron's presentation of problems associated with the stability of the rate of change, but here the problem is narrative history and not statistics. The static fallacy "broadly consists in any attempt to conceptualize a dynamic problem in static terms."[47] Fischer's example was to cite those who would view the history of the United States as a gradual unfolding of democracy. For German history, Ralf Dahrendorf has characterized an extreme point of view which would look at the so-called darker side of the German character: "'The Germans have always run true to the type described by Tacitus.'"[48] The fallacies of "presumptive

continuity" and "presumptive change" (in this case, Fischer's terminology) are ones in which either continuity or change are assumed to be the normal state of affairs without any attempt to explain the underlying causes which would support either continuity or change.[49] One last fallacy of change to consider is the genetic fallacy, which confuses "the becoming of a thing for the thing which it has become." The genetic fallacy also may include the conversion of "a temporal sequence into an ethical system--history into morality," and for Fischer the prime example of a conversion of history into a morality play was the German concept of historicism, since it held "the nasty idea that whatever is becoming is right."[50] Fischer went on to state that it would be fallacious to conclude that Hitler came out of a historicism which had its roots in the writings of Herder (although the implication was there notwithstanding any denials).[51] Walter Hofer, the Swiss historian, wrote about the complex interrelationship between German historical thought and 1933:

> Ideas permit, because of their inmost nature, the most divergent interpretations, and hence realizations. That they can degenerate need not be a reproach against their authors . . . . In the case of the degeneration of historical thought in Germany, we ought not to speak of a logically consistent development toward inescapable disaster.[52]

The transformation of ideas and the concept of continuity will be dealt with in a discussion of shared paradigms later in this chapter.

As Gerschenkron has noted in his discussion of causal regress and periodicity, historical continuity also involves the concept of causation, since continuity is comprised of a series of events which must be coherently connected.[53] Causation, however, can be ambiguous because of the number and nature of antecedents possible in a causal

chain. Causation, furthermore, is closely related to continuity since "when considering the question of continuity one can only look for preconditions which explain why in a similar, non-predictable constellation precisely these consequences occurred."[54] Fischer rightly noted that the concept of causation has been questioned since the early part of the twentieth century, and even though it "recently" (circa 1970) has been regaining respectability, historians are still avoiding the word "causation" in favour of constructing "cryptocausal interpretations" through a host of synonyms, such as "'influences,' 'impulses,' 'elements,'" and so forth.[55] Today, it would appear that historians still have problems with the concept of causation. There is a seeming lack of agreement about "whether establishing causation is . . . the aim [of historians]; and furthermore there is a glaring lack of agreement about what the establishment of causation involves."[56] However, whether there are "cryptocausal interpretations" or a fundamental lack of agreement on causation itself, there are still some rules of logic which bear on the problem of historical continuity. Moreover, the connection between continuity and causation may be treated by briefly examining some of the logical pitfalls which are to be avoided rather than entering into a discussion of the still unresolved debate about whether or not causation demands the creation of covering law models.[57]

Fallacies of causation revolve around the placement of antecedents, the relation of antecedents to effect in time, and the number of antecedents. The fallacy of *post hoc, propter hoc* confuses the relationship between antecedent and cause by stating that if event A

happened before event B then event A was the cause of B merely because A preceded B; mere temporal precedence cannot establish causality. The reverse of this error is the fallacy of *pro hoc, propter hoc*, which puts the effect before the cause. Another fallacy of relationship, and one commonly cited in books on statistics, is *cum hoc propter hoc*, or false correlation, which is rather complex, since many relationships may be coincidentally related without being causally related. For example, as bizarre as it may be, some have pointed out the coincidences between Presidents Lincoln and Kennedy: Lincoln was shot in Ford's Theatre and his assassin escaped to a barn, where he was shot; Kennedy was shot in a Ford motorcar (a Lincoln) and his assassin was captured in a movie theatre; Lincoln was first elected in 1860 and Kennedy was elected in 1960; Lincoln's secretary was named Kennedy and Kennedy's secretary was named Lincoln, and so forth. There are coincidences here but no correlations. Another point regarding correlation is that in statistical relationships, while one can validly generalize for a group, it may be difficult to determine the correlation between what is valid for a group and what is valid in regard to the behaviour of an individual within that group; the two are not necessarily synonymous.

There are several fallacies in which the number of antecedents are juggled about. The reductive fallacy, as the name suggests, smooths and reduces the number of antecedents in a causal explanation so that often one is left with a causal chain of singular simplicity which is "stretched taut across a vast chasm of complexity" (for example, in the chain which begins, "for want of a nail the shoe was lost").[58] Opposed to this is the fallacy of indiscriminate pluralism, in which the number

of antecedents is multiplied indiscriminately and no weight is assigned to any of the components; the result is a causal jungle.[59] The fallacy of identity assumes that the effect must be similar to the cause; for example, religious effects demand religious causes, economic effects demand economic causes, political effects demand political causes, and so forth. In a simplistic sort of way, in German history, the fallacy of identity is demonstrated when scholars have taken the following phrases to extremes: "*der Primat der Außenpolitik*," or "*der Primat der Innenpolitik*," so that a history of foreign policy is completely detached from domestic considerations or domestic policy is the force which ultimately lies behind every consideration of foreign policy (this will be further developed in Chapter 2).

It is clear from reading both Gerschenkron and Fischer that there are ambiguities in the creation of any kind of historical continuity. The delineation of the determination of all of Gerschenkron's five elements is the result of the interaction between the personal values of the historian and the historical material being examined. While some of the rules of logic as applied to history by Fischer are seemingly self-evident, such as *pro hoc, propter hoc*, some are not self-evident. For example, there could be legitimate differences regarding the fallacy of identity; what might be a fallacy for one scholar might be valid scholarship for another. It would be incorrect, however, to say that this process is wholly subjective. The very nature of scholarly activity lies in its public nature. Thus, the findings of a particular scholar are subjected to peer review. It is this process of public examination and criticism which constitutes scholarly objectivity. As

Karl Popper has written:

> objectivity is closely bound up with the *social aspect of scientific method*, with the fact that science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the attempts of an individual scientist to be 'objective', but from the *friendly-hostile co-operation of many scientists*. Scientific objectivity can be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method.[60]

Popper's conceptualization of scientific (i.e., scholarly) objectivity has also been called inter-subjective verification. Any particular construction of historical continuity must be subject to this process of inter-subjective verification, whether one looks at elements of continuity or rules of logic.

Not only are the results of scholarship regarding the construction of historical continuity tested through this process of inter-subjective verification, but the testing process itself takes place within a community of scholars who share certain presuppositions as well as dispositions towards the subject matter at hand. As mentioned earlier, there is not only continuity of the subject matter, but also continuity in the scholarly guild as well as in the assumptions which they use to interpret the historical data. Both these points have been addressed by Thomas Kuhn in his investigation of scientific revolutions. In Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the two essential elements for the establishment of a paradigm are that it be "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and that it be "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practioners to solve."[61] According to Kuhn, the word "paradigm" has been

> used in two different senses. On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of remaining puzzles of normal science.[62]

When a change occurs in the paradigm, it is not purely a change in the "puzzle-solutions," but also a change in the community. Thus, to evaluate a change in paradigms also means evaluating a change in community, for "in paradigm choice there is no standard higher than the community," and thus the "issue of paradigm choice can never be settled by logic and experiment alone."[63]

Continuity is a construct of the historian. The historian works with his material in ordering the past, for continuity does not lie "simply in the subject matter alone."[64] Hofer put it well when he said that the past is not to be compared with a photograph but rather to a painting; thus, "a historical problem is always a question by the present to the past. . . . [and] the questioner's interest and principle of selection and . . . his value system and ideology are decisive factors in the definition of the question."[65] In the same way in which one seeks to interpret a painting from the perspective of the school of painting to which the artist belonged, one might well say that in interpreting constructions of continuities or discontinuities by historians, it would be helpful to do so from the perspective of the school to which the scholar belonged.

NOTES

1. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. 9, ed. by Joachim Leuschner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 11, 14 and 17; Fritz Fischer, "Zum Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Geschichte von Bismarck zu Hitler," in *Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933-1945: Eine Bilanz*, ed. by Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, vol. 21 in *Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1983), 770-771.

2. See: N. Herold, "Kontinuität, historische," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 4 (I-K), ed. by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1976), 1038-1042; Salomon Bochner, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Nature and Knowledge," in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 1, ed. by Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 492-504.

3. Patrick Gardiner, ed., *Theories of History*, The Free Press Textbooks in Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959); Patrick Gardiner, ed., *The Philosophy of History*, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); note: *Theories* has both a name and subject index while *Philosophy* has only a name index.

4. Michael Oakeshott, "Historical Continuity and Causal Analysis," in *Philosophical Analysis and History*, ed. William H. Dray, Sources in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Frank A. Tillman (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 210.

5. Johann Gustav Droysen, "Grundriß der Historik: Die letzte Druckfassung (1882)," in Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik: Historische-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. by Peter Leyh (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1977), 436: § 45: "das Gebiet der historischen Methode ist der Kosmos der sittlichen Welt" (435). § 48: "In ihnen bauend und formend, im Arbeiten werdend, schafft die Menschheit den Kosmos der sittlichen Welt . . . . Ihre Arbeit würde wie Dünensand unfruchtbar und ein Spiel der Winde sein ohne das Bewußtsein der Kontinuität, ohne Geschichte" (436).

6. Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, *The Modern Researcher*, fourth edition (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985), 44.

7. Bochner, 502.

8. On chronicles, see for example: Ernest Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 82-84, 104-105, and 126-132.

9. Ibid., 103.

10. Arnaldo Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* Beiheft 6 (1966), 19.

11. Ibid., 18.

12. Ibid., 18-19.

13. Brevard S. Childs, *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 78. Of interest regarding the process of canonization of the text are chapter 2, "The Problem of the Canon" (pp. 46-68) and Chapter 3, "Canon and Criticism" (pp. 69-82), and Chapter 4, "Text and Canon" (pp. 84-108).

14. Emil Brunner, "Religionsphilosophie: Protestantische Theologie," in *Handbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 2, *Natur/Geist/Gott*, ed. A. Baeumler and M. Schröder (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1927), 80:

> Für den kritischen Historiker als solchen ist die Bibel eine zufällige Einheit, eine Sammlung von Dokumenten verschiedenster Art, darum ein Repertorium von Bausteinen zur Rekonstruktion eines allgemeinen historischen Zusammenhangs. Eine "Bibel" gibt es für ihn nicht. Denn was dem Glauben die Bibel zur Einheit macht, existiert für ihn als Mann der Wissenschaft nicht. Er kann vielmehr von diesen Dokumenten nur dann Gebrauch machen, wenn er aus dieser "zufälligen" Einheit, dem Kanon herauslöst, um jeden Teil am richtigen Ort des historisches Kontinuums einzufügen. Aber was ist das historische *Kontinuum*? Nicht bloß der kausale Zusammenhang der raumzeitlichen Geschehnisse. Als solche, als bloßer Vergangenheitsfilm, sind sie noch sinnlos. Neben dem raumzeitlichen braucht der Historiker vielmehr noch ein anderes Kontinuum: das natürlich-menschlich Analogische. Im raumzeitlichen Kontinuum ist jedes sinvolle Wort eine dunkle Stelle. Denn "Sinn" ist keine sichtbare, raumzeitliche Begebenheit. Aber im Kontinuum des Analogischen ist das sinvolle Wort eine helle Stelle: gerade dadurch, daß es einen verständlichen Sinn hat, ist es als Geschichtsfaktum einreihbar.

15. Alexander Gerschenkron, "Some Methodological Problems in Economic History," chap. in *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, Alexander Gerschenkron (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 44.

16. Herold, 1039:

> Mit dem Begriff h.K. ist die Frage nach der Möglichkeit und der Voraussetzungen eines Zusammenhanges von Geschichte gestellt. Seine Verwendung kennzeichnet eine historische Situation, in welcher der Zusammenhalt von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart fraglich geworden ist.

17. Henry George Liddel and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, ninth edition, ed. Sir Henry Stuart Jones and Robert Mckenzie, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 1713-1714; P.G.W. Glare, ed., *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 431-432.

18. "Kortinuität," in Gerhard Wahrig+, Hildegard Kramer, and Harald Zimmermann, eds., *Brockhaus Währig Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. 4 (Wiesbaden: F.A.Brockhaus, 1982), 254; "Kontinuierlich," in Autorenkollektivs des Zentralinstituts für Sprachwissenschaft, *Entymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1989), 905); Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik: Historisch-kritische Aufgabe*, ed. by Peter Leyh (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzbog, 1977), 513; Leopold Krieger, *Ranke: The Meaning of History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 394.

19. Henry Ritter, *Dictionary of Concepts in History* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1986), 319. Ritter made his comments under the topic of "Periodization" (pp. 313-319), and was commenting on the discussions by German historians of the division between late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages.

20. Georg Iggers, *The Conception of German History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, revised edition (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). There was no reference in the index to one of the main protagonists of the debate, Alfons Dopsch, and the reference (p. 338) to the other protagonist, Hermann Aubin, did not correspond with any mention of Aubin on either that or surrounding pages (the reference, furthermore, was to the end notes). The correct reference, however, is to be found on page 346, note 35, which in turn is a reference to page 236, on which Iggers commented that those associated with the *Vierteljahrschrift* were a "strange combination of socialists and reactionaries." Thus, individuals such as Aubin stood outside the tradition which Iggers was investigating. Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zum Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1951). Srbik mentioned Aubin, as well as several others, all of whom were responsible for using *Landesgeschichte* with fruitful results in developing new conceptualizations of legal, economic, and population history as they related to the development of the German people in Middle Europe (339). Srbik's reference to Dopsch only made mention of two of Dopsch's works, *Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit* (published in two volumes in 1912/13) and *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Grundlagen der europäischen Kulturentwicklung aus der Zeit von Cäsar bis auf Karl den Großen* (published in 1918) (117).

21. Paul Egon Hübinger, "Einleitung," in *Kulturbruch oder Kulturkontinuität im Übergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. Paul Egon Hübinger (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), vii. This contextualization is also supported by Hermann Bausinger, "Zur Algebra der Kontinuität," chap. in *Kontinuität? Geschichtlichkeit und Dauer als volkskundliches Problem*, ed. Hermann Bausinger and Wolfgang Brückner (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1969), 9-10.

22. Bernd Faulenbach, *Ideologie des deutschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1980), 89. On *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, see: Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989), 282.

23. Bausinger, 10. For example, Dopsch wrote: "Wir sind von der Schule her gewöhnt, in der Geschichte das Altertum von dem Mittelalter scharf zu scheiden . . . daß zwischen dieser [der alten Welt] und dem Mittelalter eine tiefe Kluft bestehe" (Alfons Dopsch, "Von Altertum zum Mittelalter. Das Kontinuitätsproblem," chap. in *Kulturbruch*, 78 [originally published in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 16 (1926): 159-182]). Aubin wrote from the opposite perspective:

> Das Allgemeinste, was man über das Kontinuitätsproblem sagen kann, ist daß es Kontinuität überall und immer gegeben hat, daß allenhalben die Völker und Lebenskreise von ihnen geschaffene Kulturgüter anderen Völkern und Lebensgemeinschaften weitergegeben und vererbt haben, daß seit Urzeiten das Leben nirgends auf eine tabula rasa neu begonnen worden ist, daß die Hälfte mindestens der Geschichte auf Kontinuität beruht und daß es ohne solche keine Historie gibt" (Herman Aubin, "Zur Frage der historischen Kontinuität im Allgemeinen," chap. in *Kulturbruch*, 164 [originally published in *Historische Zeitschrift* 168 (1943): 229-262]).

24. On the one hand, Dopsch could write about continuity in a specific situation:

> Hier tritt die Kontinuität von Altertum zum Mittelalter konkret in die Erscheinung; die germanischen Fürsten und Könige haben das ehemals römische Staatsgut an sich genommen und darüber dann weiter verfügt. Ferner aber ist eine weitgehende Übereinstimmung zwischen den späteren Straßenzügen im Rheinlande und in Hessen vielfach eine Anlehnung an die römischen Verhältnisse (Blockform) bekunden. (Dopsch, "Von Altertum," 83)

Aubin, on the other hand, wrote:

> Wir haben das Moment der Bevölkerungsart bisher unter dem Geschichtspunkte herangezogen, daß wir in dem weiterlebenden romanischen Element die mehr oder weniger Bildungselemente ins Mittelalter Brücke zum Übergang antiker Bildungselemente ins Mittelalter sehen (Aubin, "Zum Frage," 185).

It is quite clear from his writings that Aubin placed the stress on "mehr" rather than "weniger."

25. Alexander Gerschenkron, "On the Concept of Continuity in History," in *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, 11-39; Donald Flemming and Bernard Bailyn, *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 689.

26. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Anwendung von Theorie in der Geschichtswissenschaft," in *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, vol. 3, Theorie der Geschichte: Beiträge zur Historik (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 25: "Jetzt sehe ich nicht, wie man erst vorindustrielle, dann die industrielle Wirtschaft ohne Information durch Theorie der Ökonomen, insbesondere von historisch argumentierenden wie Smith, Marx, Weber, Schmoller, Schumpeter, Gerschenkron, u.a., angemessen erfassen kann."

27. Gerschenkron, "On the Concept of Continuity in History," in *Continuity*, 39.

28. Ibid., 21.

29. Ibid., 38.

30. Ibid., 22. As an example of progress, Gerschenkron referred to Buckle's view that "truth marches on 'always advancing, never receding.'"

31. Ibid., 23 and 24.

32. Ibid., 25.

33. Ibid., 28.

34. Wehler, "Anwendung," in *Theorie und Erzählung*, 25.

35. Gerschenkron, "On the Concept of Continuity in History," in *Continuity*, 30.

36. For an example, see: Wehler, "Anwendung," in *Theorie und Erzählung*, 14.

37. Gerschenkron, "On the Concept of Continuity in History," in *Continuity*, 32.

38. Ibid., 34. Although Gerschenkron did not go into any elaborate detail on the smoothing of curves to eliminate discontinuity, some delightful examples of statistical manipulation may be found in: Darrell Ruff, *How to Lie With Statistics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1954, especially chapter 5, "The Gee-Whiz Graph" (60-65).

39. Jörn Rüsen, *Historische Vernunft: Grundzüge einer Historik I: Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1983), 55.

40. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*, 11.

41. Wehler, "Anwendung," in *Theorie und Erzählung*, 32: "Eine schroffe Dichotomie von theorieorientierten Vorgehen und Narratio zu behaupten, führt zu einer unproduktiven, rigoristischen Polarisierung."

42. David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970). Fischer's work must be used with some qualification, since at times Fischer was too petty and literal in his analysis. For example, in discussing the fallacy of anachronism, he wrote about misplaced "object[s], event[s], or word[s]." Thus: "The title of William Allen White's biography of Calvin Coolidge provides two examples in four words--*A Puritan in Babylon*" (133). It seems obvious that "Puritan" and "Babylon" are contrasting metaphors and in this case the "howler" was not that White used metaphors in his title but that Fischer could have been so literal. The fallacies which have been listed are by no means exhaustive of the fallacies which Fischer included in these two chapters. They have been chosen for their relevance to the topic being considered.

43. Ibid., xii.

44. Ibid., 130.

45. Ibid., 135.

46. Karl Buchheim, "The *Via Dolorosa* of the Civilian Spirit in Germany," chap. in *German History: Some New German Views*, ed. by Hans Kohn (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), 60. This essay was taken from Buchheim's *Leidensgeschichte des Zivilen Geistes oder die Demokratie Deutschlands* (Munich, 1951). Buchheim was born in 1889, received his doctorate from the University of Leipzig in 1913, and in 1951 was an associate professor of history at the Technische Hochschule in Munich.

47. Fischer, 153.

48. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1969), 25. This was first published in Germany in 1965.

49. Fischer, 153.

50. Ibid., 155.

51. Ibid., 156.

52. Walter Hofer, "Toward a Revision of the German Concept of History," chap. in Kohn, 200. Hofer's essay was originally printed in an unabridged form in March 1948 in *Schweizerische Hochschulzeitung*.

53. See endnote 34.

54. Thomas Nipperdey, "1933 and the Continuity of German History," chap. in *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. by H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1985), 491. Nipperdey's essay was originally published as "1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte," in

Historische Zeitschrift 227 (1978).

55. Fischer, 165. Lichtman and French brought out the problem that historians have with causation by citing Michael Scriven, a philosopher of history, who "found that a single page of an encyclopedia article on English history included almost thirty claims of causal connection, only two of which were identified by the word 'cause.'" They went on to write that, "our everyday language is so possessed by the spirit of causality that it cannot be exorcised." Allan J. Lichtman and Valerie French, *Historians and the Living Past: The Theory and Practice of Historical Study* (Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1978), 45. Unfortunately, the book possesses little notation regarding sources and no reference to Scriven's particular study is to be found; however, the reference to Scriven is: Michael Scriven, "Causes, Connections, and Conditions in History," in *Philosophical Analysis and History*, ed. William H. Dray, 238. Scriven's article was written especially for Dray's anthology.

56. Christopher Lloyd, "The Methodologies of Social History: A Critical Survey and Defense of Structuralism," *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* 30 (1991): 192.

57. The literature on covering law models is quite extensive, for example, see relevant articles in both works by Gardiner and also Dray; while it is an important topic, it seems to be somewhat beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Furthermore, others refer to causation without entering into this discussion; for example, Nipperdey in endnote 54; also, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, without going into a discussion of covering laws, wrote about the usefulness of theory hypotheses serving to include functional relationships and explaining causal relationships, in Wehler, "Anwendung," in *Theorie und Erzählung*, 36:

> § 5.3. Hinsichtlich der bevorzugten Problemfelder sollte die Theorie Hypothesen zur Erfassung funktionaler und zur Erklärung kausaler Beziehungen zur Verfügung stellen oder doch ihre Bildung anleiten können, damit entweder auf der Linie eines historischen Funktionalismus das Beziehungsgeflecht der Abhängigkeiten schärfer erfaßt oder, das wäre ein noch höherer Anspruch, die strukturelle Determinanten so heraus präpariert werden können, daß gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Ablauf der Zeit kausal erklären wird.

58. Fischer, 172.

59. Both of the preceding two fallacies are the narrative equivalent of Gerschenkron's discussion of statistical manipulation in smoothing a curve to eliminate discontinuity or unsmoothing a curve to create discontinuity; see the discussion on pages 15-16.

60. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, vol. 2, *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 217.

61. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, second edition, enlarged (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 10.

62. Ibid., 175.

63. Ibid., 94.

64. Nipperdey, 501.

65. Hofer, 188.

Chapter 2

Hans-Ulrich Wehler: *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* and Continuity in German History

Hans-Ulrich Wehler's *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*[1] attempted to take a new look at continuity in German history in the light of the concepts of societal or social history (*Gesellschafts-geschichte* or *Sozialgeschichte*) in order to provide a context for explaining the Hitler era. Wehler challenged what he saw as historical continuity in German history on three levels: he challenged continuity within the established paradigm of history as being written from a purely narrative-political aspect (which, for example, stressed the "primacy of foreign policy" [*"Primat der Außenpolitik"*]);[2] he challenged continuity within the historical profession itself as self-perpetuating both in terms of scholarly orientation to the existing paradigm and professional recruitment;[3] and, implicitly here but explicitly elsewhere, he challenged continuity as a historical concept whose purpose was/is to provide a legitimizing function for the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.[4] As he wrote in the introduction to the English edition,

> The guiding question underlying this book has been to investigate why Hitler's Nationalist Socialist regime came to power some dozen years after the end of the monarchy; why this regime succeeded in establishing a system of unprecedented terror and barbaric mass extermination; and why it proved capable of conducting a second total war.[5]

According to Wehler, previous historians placed the origins of the Hitler era primarily during the Weimar Republic, either to "stall a

discussion of German militarism" (Gerhard Ritter), or "to defend the so-called ideal pre-1914 world" (Karl-Dietrich Bracher).[6] Wehler understood his task to show that the conditions for what happened in 1933 did not come into existence after 1918, but that a "majority of these conditions" were to be found either as originating during the *Kaiserreich* or as a result of policies established during the *Kaiserreich*.[7] To expand the boundaries of continuity in German history, Wehler sought to establish a new paradigm in German historical science/scholarship (*Geschichtswissenschaft*) for the writing of German history, and that paradigm was *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* and the phrase associated with that paradigm is "the primacy of domestic policy" ("*der Primat der Innenpolitik*").[8]

To date, this work is Wehler's only systematic effort at investigating the *Kaiserzeit* as a whole. His *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* concentrated on German colonial policy from 1860 to 1890 and *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918* consisted of a series of essays dealing with topics related to the *Kaiserreich*, essays on Eckart Kehr and Gustav Mayer, and two essays dealing with the historical development and theoretical considerations of modern German economic and social history.[9] Wehler's approach to the writing of history as *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was also the approach he used in these earlier works, for example, criticizing the traditional German approach to writing history as well as advocating "the primacy of domestic development" ("*dem Primat der inneren Entwicklung*").[10]

In Germany, since the days of Ranke until well after the Second World War, the traditional approach to *Geschichtswissenschaft* was known

as *Historismus*.[11] There has been considerable confusion regarding what exactly is meant by *Historismus*.[12] By *Historismus*, Wehler understood an approach to history that revolved around the "dogma of individuality" and viewed with skepticism any social scientific approach to the writing of history.[13] Furthermore, *Historismus*, by stressing individuality and noncomparability in events, led some historians (specifically, Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand) to equate National Socialism with Hitlerism.[14] For Wehler, even though this kind of historiography justifiably made room for the concept of continuity as a "core concept," the continuity that was developed was so hedged with exceptions and "thousands of reservations," that when applied to the problem of continuity in German history the result was that "the policies of National Socialism" were conceived of "as a so-called illegitimate result of German history instead of recognizing it first of all as a result of a deeply profoundly rooted continuity precisely of this history."[15] Theoretically, at least, one is reminded that with the proper scale any series can be smoothed into a continuity or, alternately, any continuity can be made discontinuous.

In order to properly investigate historical processes, Wehler himself advocates combining the methodology and theory of the social sciences with traditional *Geschichtswissenschaft*. In this regard, Wehler considers himself, at least in part, to be following in the footsteps of Eckart Kehr, who was an advocate of the idea of the primacy of domestic policy (*Primat der Innenpolitik*). This primacy of domestic politics was opposed to the "traditionally and unquestionably sterile 'Primacy of foreign policy'" which had been the position of German

historians since Ranke.[16] Kehr's view of history emphasized the social over the individual; for Kehr,

> the problem of history is not the willfulness of human beings who appear to be directing these institutions, but the fact that they are the captives of the laws that govern their institutions and their class and are subordinate to their interests without even being aware of their dependence.[17]

This socio-economic emphasis of Kehr meant that Kehr found the continuities of German history in the "ascertainable social historical fundamental strata where constancy prevailed under the turmoil of political change."[18] In 1965, Wehler edited and published Kehr's "most important essays" in a book, *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (Berlin, 1965).[19] Wehler assessed Kehr's historiographical importance as follows:

> In its connection to critical theory and imposing empirical research, Kehr's work remains--possibly also as a torso--even to this day a very important example for political instruction and the pressing tasks of our time, [being] a completely open-minded historical science.[20]

Wehler's comments regarding Kehr speak as much about Kehr's approach to historical science as about Wehler's championing that same approach; in other words and to some extent, form over substance, although in many cases Kehr's substance was impressive enough. Regarding some of the substance of Kehr's work, however, Gordon Craig paraphrased Klaus Epstein's assessment that Kehr's "work should be read with a decent amount of caution rather than with any preconception that it represents the new historical gospel."[21]

Of course, Wehler followed in the footsteps of others beside Kehr, particularly Hans Rosenberg.[22] In regard to the "primacy of foreign policy," Rosenberg said that continuity in Bismarckean foreign policy

was "dependent upon the primacy of the militant conservative-authoritarian domestic policy within the framework of Bismarck's total policy."[23] Rosenberg looked at the effects of both short-term and long-term economic cycles during the period of 1873-1896; however, since reality is so multi-faceted, he warned against any kind of mono-causal explanatory structure and that the influence of economic conjunctures was only a single causal factor among many factors.[24]

In 1974, Wehler edited a Festschrift for Hans Rosenberg's seventieth birthday. In assessing Rosenberg's work, and especially his *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit*, Wehler wrote:

> In spite of some theoretical and empirical difficulties, which, incidentally, Rosenberg would have been the first to concede, the book still opened so many new perspectives and possibilities of interpretation--whether of industrial growth or of parties, the history of associations, of politically organized anti-Semitism, or a general "deliberalization" since the 1870s--and, even in this regard, it won a special place . . . . The persuasiveness of [Rosenberg's] study precipitated [the publication of] a lot of monographs, but also this volume, and it would not be a too daring prediction that Rosenberg's "Groβe Depression" will remain "essential" for the treatment of the second half of the nineteenth century. One is not able to say that frequently about a book.[25]

This was deservedly high praise for Rosenberg, whose works did indeed open new perspectives upon which German historians capitalized.[26] For Hans Mommsen, Rosenberg's work on the Great Depression laid the groundwork for Wehler's work on the *Bismarckzeit*.[27] Moreover, Roger Fletcher believed that Wehler and others in the "Bielefeld School" took Rosenberg's work to its theoretical conclusion.[28]

What Wehler and other historians such as Werner Conze had been looking for was nothing less than a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of German history.[29] This shift was to be

characterized by a widening of the parameters of historical understanding of what *Geschichtswissenschaft* was to include. The shift was to go beyond both a "modernization of classical historicism"[30] and even a "willing opening towards the neighbouring scholarly disciplines" (*Nachbarwissenschaften*--this being understood as complimentary to *Geschichtswissenschaft*).[31] This was to be "wherever possible a fusion in direction towards a historical social science," and by fusion Wehler had and has in mind the theory, the figures of thought or logic (*Denkfiguren*), and the methodology of such disciplines as sociology, economics, and psychology.[32]

Wehler's expression of what this fusion can do is worth quoting at length:

> As a decisive historical point, it is to be emphasized here that the solution--to a large extent unsolvable--calls for an extraordinarily important problem to be dealt with by the historical social sciences. The historical constellations of social inequality, especially the meaning and development of classes conditioned by the market, the stages of economic growth, above all the contents and consequences of the cyclical model of industrial capitalism, mobility research, the socio-cultural dimension of daily life and the legitimization problem of the regime--all these questions, which precisely occupy analysis not only for social, economic, political, and cultural history, but also for societal history as a paradigm of up-to-date historical synthesis of the highest priority, in my view are able to be explained most easily by a historical social science [*Historische Sozialwissenschaft*], whose indisputable standards of quality must be justifiably of a solid empirical soundness and a persuasive theoretical explanation.[33]

To be sure, Wehler does not claim that this fusion will solve all problems, but he does claim that greater clarification will be the result. While this fusion might seem to be related to the French *Annales* School, Wehler himself was lukewarm to the structuralism associated with the *Annales*. For Wehler, the "programmatic thesis" of

the *Annales* "remained sketchy, [and] a precise definition of the structures worth investigating was not provided, and the concept was too vague, too formal, and too lacking in content for its claimed integrational capacity."[34] Wehler has not changed his opinion as of 1988.[35]

This new theoretical orientation for German historians, moreover, would give German history an "emanicipatory task," a task which Wehler believed complimentary to the traditional understanding of *Historismus*, which had concentrated on "the historical participants in the horizon of empirical knowledge of their time."[36] In spite of the criticisms both of this approach and of Wehler himself, Wehler rhetorically asked his critics whether they really would want to overturn this development.[37] The answer would be a qualified "no."

Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand were part of a group for whom such a qualification existed, because the application of the theories, figures of thought/logic, and the methodology of the social sciences would directly affect the continuity of the historical process as well as continuity in history itself by denigrating the factors of contingency and the importance of the individual.[38] In a 1976 essay critiquing *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, Klaus Hildebrand quoted Ernst Schulin in critiquing Wehler's approach:

> Historical science, in an extraordinary manner, must highly respect the meaning of each special situation, of individual personal desires and decisions, and last but not least, those suprisingly "accidental" events. No other science diminishes the balancing off of these important concepts.[39]

In this critique, one returns to the concepts of individuality in specific situations and above all to the highly respected possibility of

accidental or chance occurrences.[40] Hildebrand went on to say that while a "theoretically oriented *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*" is a historiographic *Teildisziplin*, it is not one which plays a leading role.[41] Furthermore, in the writing of international political history (or relations), *Gesellschaftgeschichte* has "no influence."[42] Hildebrand believed that international relations were somehow autonomous from *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. Thus, Hildebrand rejected any paradigm shift. It is, however, interesting to note that in his 1971 book, Hildebrand could write:

> The thesis of the primacy of foreign policy has been sharply disputed in postwar German historical writing. It is now almost commonplace to insist that due regard be paid to the interdependence of domestic and foreign policies and that this is the crucial characteristic of modern historiography.[43]

Furthermore, Hildebrand concluded that, in part, there were continuities between the foreign policy of the *Kaiserreich* and that of the National Socialists; for example, continuities may be found (at least for a while) in an "identity of aims" but discontinuities are revealed in a difference in methods.[44]

In regard to the relationship of the methodology of the social sciences to *Geschichtswissenschaft*, Hildebrand specifically referred to the Lamprecht controversy of circa 1897.[45] This controversy concerned the social scientific methodological approach to historical scholarship; for example, Hintze wrote to Friedrich Meinecke "whether constitutional history is able to be handled only in an institutional-historical [manner] or also sociologically."[46] For Hildebrand, the Lamprecht controversy vindicated the Rankean conceptualization of history of each human having his own historical dimension versus a Hegelian dialectic

which would mediate between the particular and the general.[47] Lamprecht, however, was neither a philosophical nor methodological determinist and did not seek to "establish rigid laws of development."[48] The eventual historiographical outcome of the Lamprecht controversy was the gradual realization of some sort of "middle ground between the extremes: between the unique event and the cosmic flow of universal history lies the realm of the repeated, the typical, the recurrent."[49]

The tension between the relationship of the individual (or unique) and the universal (or recurring) arose and still arises when a historian (or group of historians) stress differing combinations of methodologies when writing about a particular period. Since 1945, in the writing of current German history, it would appear that the political orientation of historians towards current political configurations in the Federal Republic has had a direct bearing on the type of methodology used. Methodology will frequently assist the historian in arriving at conclusions which are historical (in this sense, *geschichts-wissenschaftlich*) while at the same time are also politically palatable, at least from the perspective of the historian. This means that when disputes arise, they not only may be conducted on an academic level but also on a personal level, *argumentum ad hominem*, as has been shown by the *Historikerstreit*.[50]

For one, Wehler himself described the situation in which the historian writes history with one eye on history proper and the other eye on the current political situation. In 1970, in the Introduction to *Krisenherde*, Wehler explicitly stated that being concerned with current

political considerations was nothing new. In echoing "Burckhardt or Droysen, Ranke or Mommsen," Wehler wrote, "Whoever writes history, especially current history, has a duty of political pedagogy."[51] He then went on to note that the historical treatment of issues concerning the *Kaiserreich*--such as the military creation of a *kleindeutsch* Reich, the concern about the definition of the German frontier, the concerns of German nationalism, the authoritarian *Gesellschaft* politics and state ideology--all had a direct bearing on political practice and formulation in the Federal Republic. An "incorrect" treatment of these issues could pose dangers for the proper democratic development of the Germany of today.[52]

Of course, Wehler was not alone in looking at the writing of history in this manner. Andreas Hillgruber, for example, in an address at the *Deutschen Historikertag* in Regensburg on 7 October 1972, criticized the approach of historians who used *Sozialgeschichte*.[53] In part, Hillgruber criticized those who used *Sozialgeschichte* in order to criticize the Federal Republic; in support, he cited Hans Rosenberg's observation, that:

> in the last few years, the so-called social history has become for many a nebulous collective name for everything which will be looked at as desirable and progressive in the historical science of West Germany.[54]

Both Hildebrand and Hillgruber linked *Sozialgeschichte* with the theories of Karl Marx;[55] needless to say, this type of labelling avoids analysis and also stereotypes one's opponents through guilt by association. For Wehler, such argumentation is a red-herring, since any "'true proponents of Marxist principles' represent an 'unqualified exception' within West German historiography."[56]

In a 1975 article and without a great deal of personal innuendo, Wehler responded to Hillgruber's call for a debate and refuted Hillgruber's arguments on a point-by-point basis, both theoretically as well as practically.[57] In regard to the current situation in the Federal Republic, Wehler pointed out that from 1945 until 1954, an examination of the listings of dissertations and *Habilitationen* revealed that the conventional approach to political history prevailed, that *Sozialgeschichte* was underrepresented in positions in the *Hochschulen*, that there was no wealth of funding for projects in this area, that it did not serve as a disguise for indoctrination, and so forth.[58] Thus, not only did Wehler note that the so-called establishment still held the field in the orientation of historical studies, but his was also a plea for the legitimacy of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* within the West German historical profession. Elsewhere, Wehler expressed the fear that the conservative majority in the historical profession would restrict the positions open to that new generation of scholars who would pursue a *gesellschaftsgeschichtlich* orientation; thus, there might be the "danger that the continuity of research will be interrupted and the ability to compete internationally will be impaired."[59]

It would appear that one of the reasons for the sharp reaction to *Das deutsche Kaiserreich* and the promotion of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* in general was the state of German universities. Student unrest in West German universities had begun in 1967-68, and by the early 1970s "the increasing popularity of extreme leftist organizations had . . . turned many West German universities into ideological battle-fields."[60] Lecture halls became battlefields, too. According to Wehler, student

confrontations turned Hillgruber from a "national liberal-left conservative" into a dedicated conservative."[61] For Hillgruber, the hidden (or maybe not-so-hidden agenda) of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was "only camouflage for unambiguous indoctrination"[62] (and the indoctrination to which Hillgruber referred was Marxist indoctrination). The government's reaction to student unrest was to increase the number of West German universities and *Fachhochschulen* (26 in 1964 to 49 by 1974), with a consequent doubling of faculty members.[63] It is not surprising to see academics on opposite sides of both the political and methodological spectra take differing positions concerning the direction of the profession and professional recruitment.

From 1945 until about 1960, there were no great controversies within German historiography. For the most part, the German historians rejected that type of intellectual history which traced the roots of National Socialism in the manner of William Montgomery McGovern's *From Luther to Hitler* (1946).[64] In 1946, Friedrich Meinecke, the dean of German historians at that time, wrote that the high calling (*hohen Beruf*) of German historians now and in the future would be: "to give evidence of both the love and severity of our past and to proceed to the task of maintaining what was truly good in it, recognizing what was valueless, and taking warning from it when one has to take action."[65] The problem, of course, would be in trying to determine what was of value and what was not. Furthermore, the call to action would be interpreted differently, depending on one's estimation of what was of value; however, such a warning certainly was but one prefigurement of Wehler's reference to "the duty of political pedagogy." For Meinecke,

the strands of continuity of the *Hitlerzeit* ran in both European as well as German history. In the words of Hans Mommsen, however, historians of the immediate post-War period, in an attempt to be committed to "a democratic order," generally portrayed the *Hitlerzeit* as a "'disjointed and isolated phenomenon' (Ludwig Dehio) and [tried] to disassociate the politics of National Socialism from the rest of German history, as if Hitler had been an unhistorical, daemonic intrusion."[66]

Throughout the 1950s, according to William Carr, any discussion of continuity in German history was limited to Bismarck studies.[67] However, as Lothar Gall wrote in his 1971 anthology of an overview of "The Bismarck Problem," the impulse behind discussions of continuity and discontinuity in German history were stimulated by the catastrophe of 1933-1945.[68] In 1961, Fritz Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands* (English translation: *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, London, 1966) was published. Fischer used traditional historical methodology but concluded that Germany's "war guilt" in regard to expansionist policies was well founded.[69] Not only did Fischer's work spark a controversy regarding the continuity between Weimar and Hitler Germany,[70] it also sparked "a many-sided evaluation of the interrelationship of economic, domestic, and diplomatic factors in Wilhelmine Germany."[71]

Fischer's work can be considered to be one of the catalysts in effecting the paradigm shift in the writing of German history,[72] although methodologically it was no shift. For Hans Mommsen, the "sharp debate" following the publication of Fischer's work was seen as leading to a failure of those who wanted "to restrict a partial revision

of the concept of history (*Geschichtsbilds*)" and opening the way to an inclusion of social historical (*sozialgeschichtliche*) and structural methods of interpretation.[73] Jörn Rüsen has theorized about this paradigm shift and its relation to his three stages in West German historiography: the "*period of renovated historicism*," which ran from the immediate post-War period until the beginning of the 1960s; the "*period of accelerated transformation*," which ran from the beginning of the 1960s through the mid-70s; and the period of "*establishing social history* (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*)," which ran from the mid-70s and continues to the present day.[74] In Rüsen's conceptualization, Fischer's work would be included in the period of "accelerated transformation," but "the so-called Fischer controversy should not be overrated as an indicator of radical change."[75] In the area of continuity, however, Wehler saw that "Fischer irrevocably placed the problematic of continuity on the agenda of historians' debates."[76]

Wehler's *The German Empire* took up the issue of continuity and also was "the single volume which embodies most of the new tendencies (and constructs) [of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*]."[77] Wehler's work attempted to integrate political history into its psycho-socio-economic matrix in order to assist in providing the "why" for the *Hitlerzeit*, since one "cannot adequately understand the history of the Third Reich without recourse to the history of the German Empire."[78] In choosing the *Kaiserreich* as the *terminus ad quem* for a study of continuity in German history, Wehler found agreement with his sharpest intellectual and professional critic, Thomas Nipperdey.[79] (Indeed, Wehler and his

editorial colleagues opened the pages of their new periodical to Nipperdey for a review of Wehler's book.[80])

Unfortunately, in the original German edition, Wehler did not provide as clear a statement of purpose as was provided in the English edition regarding the intention and genesis of the book. The introduction to the English language edition was partially based on an article which he had written in order to respond to his critics.[81] The book itself grew out of a seminar which Wehler had given at the University of Cologne in the late 1960s. Wehler explicitly stated that he was interested in being "pointed" in order to stimulate questions and further research rather than in confirming "received views" or developing "orthodoxies in themselves."[82] Evans, however, echoed James J. Sheehan on Wehler's book being the "'new orthodoxy' in German historiography," but Evans went on to describe Wehler as "a representative figure of this 'new orthodoxy.'"[83] New orthodoxy or not, Wehler succeeded in stimulating debate and the book has gone through six editions and as of 1984 had sold 130,000 copies.[84] For Wehler, *The German Empire* is not the final word on the subject. He is very much aware of its incompleteness. On the one hand, the book had to be limited to a paperback edition of about 240 pages;[85] on the other, there were sections which were not ready for inclusion. He apologized for not including a chapter on culture, with culture being defined "in the broad sense of modern social anthropology rather than 'high' culture," as well as not including a chapter on "Social Structure and Societal Development."[86]

The focus of *The German Empire* is to give "an impression of the German Empire as a totality and of the interconnectedness of its politics with its economy and society."[87] Politically, one sees the way in which Bismarck and his successors intentionally used the politics of negative integration, that is: "the primeval socio-psychic opposition between 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' . . . [which] stylized internal conflicts so as to lead a majority of elements 'loyal to the Empire' against a minority of 'enemies of the Empire.'"[88] At various times, Bismarck's self-proclaimed enemies included Catholics, Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, Danes, political liberalism, Social Democracy, and Jews. Thus, society became used to the idea that not only were there divisions within society itself but that these divisions existed among and between the very citizens of the state itself.[89]

For Wehler, the logical conclusion of the politics of negative integration was to be seen in the Final Solution. The rationale behind this conclusion is as follows:

> That one had some neighbours who were inferior became part and parcel of everyday life during the fifty years of the German Empire's existence and helped to foster a mentality which polarized citizens on a "friend" or "foe" basis. This helps explain why the psychological barriers against the physical liquidation of minorities could be broken down so quickly in, of all people, the nation of "poets and thinkers." Viewed from a historical perspective, it is possible to trace a line from the "enemies of the Empire" to the attacks on the Jewish synagogues in 1938 (*Reichskristallnacht*) as well as to the Nazi ideal of a "folk community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*) with its necessary corollary of "parasites on the nation" which had to be exterminated.[90]

The one place in the book, however, where annihilation (*Vernichtung*, which can also be translated as "extermination") as an official policy is specifically mentioned is in regard to German colonial policy in South-West Africa and the crushing of the Herero uprising of 1904-07,

under a military rather than civilian administration.[91] This incident, however, is only related to the concerns of the Liberals and others regarding German colonial policy and, if anything, is only considered to be a foreshadowing of the ferocity of the war which was to come. As such, then, there did not seem t be any domestic correspondence between the treatment of Africans and th treatment of the so-called "enemies of the Empire." Wehler, furthermore, did not mention the strong opposition to the war and the condemnation of "genocide" by the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, which contributed to the recall of General Trotha in 1905.[92]

In the section dealing with anti-Semitism and the treatment of minorities, Wehler showed how anti-Semitism "with Bismarck's approval, became widespread among the conservatives . . . via the Agrarian League . . . [and then] into the old power elites, where its slogans became respectable."[93] The growth of anti-Semitism was related to economic crises (see Rosenberg's *Grosse Depression*, although Wehler did not cite this work in this context). In part, Wehler tied the growth of anti-Semitism to the social respectibility given to it by Bismarck himself. As an unofficial policy, in 1899 the United Association of Anti-Semitic Parties (*Vereinigte Antisemitenparteien*) foreshadowed the Final Solution with their call for an eventual "annihilation of the Jewish people" (*schließliche Vernichtung des Judenvolkes*).[94] In the post-War period, the German middle class was increasingly insecure and found an escape in anti-Semitism; after 1929, the National Socialists were able to play on this fear with increasing effectiveness.

The politics of negative integration became institutionalized through *Sammlungspolitik*--the politics of collective interests--which in turn was a reflection of the attempt by various feudal--or semi-feudal--oligarchies to retain domestic power in the face of increasing industrialization and change.[95] The parties participating in the *Sammlungspolitik* were big business and large-scale agriculture. For example, in pursuing their policies, the coalition remained flexible enough to seek support of the middle class and even the Centre Party in support of the Naval Bill.[96] In 1918, Walter Rathenau, who in 1921 was assassinated by anti-Semitic extremists, said of the German ruling elites that for centuries only those ruled who were members of or converts to "military feudalism, the feudalised bureaucracy, or the feudalised, militarised and bureaucratised plutocracy."[97] The plutocracy's ultimate right-wing party emerged in 1917 as the German Fatherland Party, whose "legitimate offspring" was the National Socialist German Workers' Party"; which is a characterization that at best is an exaggeration. Wehler, however, saw the clear connection between the Fatherland Party and the Nazis in "the history of its members, its social background, ideology, and programme."[98] This is one of those many places where one wishes that some sort of chronology and documentation might have been provided so as to firm up the linkages between the *Kaiserreich* and the *Hitlerzeit*. One might say that at this point the links in the causal chain were constructed in part out of interpretative leaps of faith.[99]

According to Wehler, the entire governmental structure was a reactionary response by the feudal or semi-feudal elements to prevent

any correspondence between economic progress and integration of the populace into any meaningful participation in government. Agrarian and industrial revolutions had transformed Germany in a remarkably short time. Wehler dated the onset of the industrial revolution in Germany at about 1850 while the agrarian revolution had its start in the law reforms of 1806-21 and "entered its final phase in the long period of economic prosperity between 1840 and 1876." Efficiency in agriculture was purchased at the expense of the peasants, free trade promoted agriculture, and the land-owning aristocracy was the beneficiary. Politically, this meant that the aristocracy continued in its dominant role of filling positions in the military, the bureaucracy, and the government.[100]

The constitution which was forged at the time of unification was tailored around Bismarck himself. For Wehler, this was just a pseudo-constitutional semi-absolutism which amounted to a "Bonapartist dictatorship up to 1890." After Bismarck's departure, the government can best be described as "polycratic, but uncoordinated authoritarianism." It was after 1890, moreover, that the large industrialists, that is, the industrial pressure groups, "alongside the Prussian bureaucracy and the imperial administration, became, next to the army and the navy, centres of power which were largely responsible for . . . government policy."[101]

The bureaucracy was the key to continuity in governmental policy. It was politically highly homogeneous, hierarchical, formalized in procedures, and gave status to even the lowliest civil servant. Even down to 1918, the nobility still held an excessive number of positions

in regard to their proportion of the population, Protestants were favoured over Catholics, and legal positivism reinforced the bureaucracy's tendency towards obedience.[102]

At this point, the question of militarism should be investigated. Then we can begin a critique of the material presented and its connection with establishing a continuity between the *Kaiserreich* and the *Hitlerzeit*.

Wehler justifiably went beyond Gerhard Ritter's rather narrow definition of militarism (i.e., when civilian political leadership is endangered by the military) and said that militarism is "the spread of military thinking in social groups exercising an important influence on society as a whole."[103] Perhaps apart from the military as a means of potential social control in the event of a leftist uprising, one of Wehler's most telling comments was that "every imperial chancellor in Germany wore a uniform when appearing in the *Reichstag*."[104] Wehler referred to Heinrich Mann's 1918 novel *Der Untertan* (translated into English as *Man of Straw*, 1946); in this novel, the protagonist is "an academic with a doctorate, a member of the student *Corps* and a reserve officer . . . [which meant] that one had achieved the very pinnacle of bourgeois achievement and happiness."[105]

Social considerations, however, also played a part in military manpower committments. In 1913, there was a vigourous debate within the military over the proposed expansion of the military to meet the needs of the Schlieffen plan. The Minister of War, von Heeringen, opposed Ludendorff's expansion because it would mean expanding the officer corps and thereby decreasing the percentage of officers drawn from the

nobility, which stood at 65 per cent in 1865 and was still 30 per cent in 1913, with a much heavier representation at higher ranks.[106] This may help explain a rather curious chart of Wehler's (page 148). The chart shows the total population and the total manpower for the army for the years 1870, 80, 90, 1900, and 1913. Wehler noted that the army increased in strength from c. 400,000 men to 864,000 men, or an increase of 116 per cent. He did not make the other calculation; the relation of the army to the population. If this calculation is made, then the manpower of the army rose from one per cent of the population to 1.3 per cent of the population, or an increase of 30 per cent, while during the same period the population as a whole rose from 40.9 million to 67 million, or an increase of 64 per cent. In absolute numbers the manpower for the army rose rather rapidly; however, in proportion to the population as a whole it actually lagged behind population growth.

In explaining imperial finances, Wehler presented several statistical tables (pages 141-143); these statistics, as well as information from other sources, can lead one to modify some of Wehler's conclusions. For example, while military expenditures rose by some 360 per cent from 1880 to 1913, revenues rose somewhere between 379 per cent and 687 per cent.[107] While Wehler stated that military expenditures remained at about 75 percent of imperial revenue from about 1875 to 1914, Terhalle stated that military expenditures comprised about 90 per cent of the imperial expenditures from 1886-90 and fell to about 75 per cent in 1911-13; however, Wehler seems to have been excluding armament expenditures from his calculation while Terhalle clearly included such expenditures in his calculation.[108] Furthermore, if one looks only at

armament expenditures, then Wehler's statistical table on armament appropriations and armament expenditures from 1880 to 1913 (p. 142), reveals that expenditures on armaments consistently and ever increasingly fell below the amount appropriated for armaments; no explanation for this phenomenon is given in the text. Wehler is correct in concluding that military expenditures placed a great burden on the imperial treasury and the method of financing the entire imperial budget placed an "enormous burden" on the "average consumer." In contrast, by 1914 in Great Britain, "a panoply of income, super-, estate- and death-duty taxes . . . virtually paid for defense expenditure." Furthermore, Kennedy stated that the real difference between Britain and Germany at this time lay less in how monies were appropriated than in how they were raised.[109]

It is certain, however, that the military reserves and veterans organizations played an important role in German political life. By 1910, the veteran's organizations numbered about 1.7 million and about another 2 million were organized into the "so-called Kyffhäuserbund." These and other like-minded organizations were "basically anti-Social Democratic and often anti-Semitic" (though it would be interesting to try to somehow quantify "often"). If one includes para-military youth organizations and the army and navy leagues, then by 1914 the army was able to count on approximately 5 million German adults, or about 17 per cent of all German adult males. For Wehler, this represented a "collective mentality" which lay behind militarism.[110] In contrast to this almost one-sided picture of the *Kaiserreich*, Golo Mann cited Bertrand Russell's retrospective observations on the Kaiser's Germany.

Russell said that while at that time Germany was only "sabre-rattling and somewhat comical," it also had "progressive forces at work" and had more freedom than one would find in the world of the 1950s outside of England or the Scandanavian countries.[111] For Mann, Wehler's characterization of the Kaiser's Germany turned into a "nightmare" (*Alptraum*) since no historical balance was provided between, for example, the cultural spheres of daily life and the Reserve Officer corps.[112]

With a discussion of militarism, one reaches the First World War. In effect, Wehler rejected Fritz Fischer's explanation of the causes of World War I by showing that it was not that German policy favoured an aggressive war in 1914, but that the ruling elites sought to maintain their domestic political position through the politics of negative integration through defensive posturing at home which was manifested abroad. Germany, then, did not spend years planning an aggressive war,[113] but because of a polycratic diffusion of power among the elites, "the key to the policy pursued by Germany's statesmen in the summer of 1914 lies in their defensive struggle through aggressive means."[114] Wehler proposed this theory because he felt that the two other major theories--that Germany planned an aggressive war and that there was a distinction to be made between vague plans drawn up in peace time and their actual implementation in a time of war--lacked "a definitive explanatory model which adequately accounts for the peculiar blend of aggressive and defensive elements in the making of German policy."[115] For Golo Mann, the idea that this war was waged for domestic reasons is both "unprovable but also implausible," since, for

example, both the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann and Admiral Tripitz knew that such a war would bring with it the end of the old order. Furthermore, such an "isolated structural analysis" ignored the fact that, for example, in relation to imperialism before 1914, Germany was not a special case when compared to the other leading powers.[116]

For Wehler, the important factors which undergird his theoretical construction regarding the outbreak of war were the rise of the representation of Social Democrats in the Reichstag as well as the rise of commercial interests and the bourgeoisie which would wrest control of the government from the ruling elites. The ruling elites fell back on their historically conditioned reflex to counter domestic problems with foreign aggressiveness in order to restore the old balance; even though the Chancellor thought that war would upset the entire balance, he was not strong enough to impose his will on the situation.[117]

Thomas Nipperdey's major theoretical point in his critique of Wehler was that since Wehler wanted to take social costs into account, Wehler's perspective of the *Kaiserreich* is from 1933 backwards.[118] This means, that rather than being understood in its own terms, the *Kaiserreich* is merely the "pre-history of fascism, the burden of German history, the structural enmity towards democracy (with, he [Wehler] opines, its effects to the present)."[119] To look at 1871 through the eyes of 1933 is of necessity to close possibilities. Although Nipperdey does not use the analogy, it is like working through a maze from the exit to the entrance--not only is it a lot easier, it is almost error free. No dead ends, only paths which continuously lead to the entrance. But while history may be written from the exit (which is the present)

backward to the entrance (the past), it is lived going forward from the entrance (the past) to the exit (the present), and this forward process often means false starts and dead ends.

In Nipperdey's words, Wehler "deforms historical judgement" since he is "fixated on a particular line of continuity"[120]--in this case, a particular direction of continuity. In the writing of history, there must be a certain openness to the future. Thus, "history must also give back to the past what the future possesses (and the past, which was once the future, possessed): the uncertainty belonging to it."[121] More than that, a partisan approach as opposed to an objective approach to the historical process itself ultimately "will deform the subject of history."[122] The correction is an objective approach consisting of intersubjective verification. The partisan approach which Wehler followed reduced the picture of the *Kaiserreich* to a black and white picture, which, while not simple, is clear.[123] This reductionist approach coloured the entire picture of the *Kaiserreich*; for example, none of the ruling groups are portrayed in a good light, the rising power of the *Reichstag* during the War is completely discounted, and of the social groups "only the Social Democrats are portrayed in a good light."[124] However one might quibble with the last assessment, since Wehler made it clear that the Social Democrats retreated into a kind of "self-enclosed 'subculture' in the place of a political programme . . . rather than persist in attempts to change society completely."[125]

Although Nipperdey alluded to it in his critique of Wehler's article, he elsewhere made quite clear that not only is there continuity in history, there are more importantly continuities.[126] Thus, 1933 is

not the accumulation of so many years of German history all neatly rolled into a ball, "but it is a new combination of continuities . . . 1933 did not develop from *the continuity* of German history . . . but 1933 is closely connected with several *dominant* continuities and without reverting to these continuities no historical explanation is possible."[127] 1933, then, was not only a year of continuity, but it was also a time when new formulations came to pass. One further problem in regard to continuity is that the exact nature of National Socialism is still a moot question.[128]

Some questions to put to Wehler's work are: what is continuous, what is discontinuous, and what is a new formation (or, formulation)? For example, regarding anti-Semitism, there is no doubt that political parties and interest groups in the *Kaiserreich* played to anti-Semitism, but can one neatly draw a line from (say) 1899 to 1933 and then the Final Solution in 1941? As J.C.G. Röhl has written: "It took the violent social changes produced by the First World War, the inflation and the Great Depression to persuade a large number of Germans to accept the fanatical beliefs of Hitler [in regard to anti-Semitism]."[129] In this regard, it is legitimate to ask how great a restructuring in society came about on account of the War? For example, no one can realistically conceive of an Adolf Hitler coming to power during the *Kaiserreich*.

It also raises another point which was raised by Röhl: "If precise comparisons are relatively easy to make when dealing with the foreign policy of German statesmen, they are virtually impossible in the field of ideas or social change."[130] One may ask, for example, how did

Germany get from 1871 to 1933? For example, Wehler admitted that the Union of Eastern Marshes constituted a "lunatic fringe" in Wilhelmine Germany.[131] The unanswered question is, how did the thinking of a marginal group become the policy of the Third Reich? What is missing in this example, as in others, is the linkage between the *Kaiserreich* and the Third Reich. Another example would be in regard to the churches. There is no doubt that the State Church (in particular, the Lutheran Church) was overtly subservient to the *Obrigkeit*. But since Wehler pointed out that the influence of the Churches was continually declining in the cities, and especially among the urban proletariat,[132] which was an increasing percentage of the population, how then does one reconcile the declining influence of a "source of legitimization" with that legitimization itself? One of the challenges is to examine the process of change and legitimization itself in many of the examples presented by Wehler. In examining the process of change within the *Kaiserreich* in a Wehlerian matrix, one can move forward from 1871 (rather than backwards from 1933, or even 1991!) and thereby avoid the problem of teleology in continuity.

There is no doubt that continuities existed between 1871, 1933, and 1948 and later; similarly, there is no doubt that discontinuities existed as well. Methodologically, Wehler has contributed a valuable and stimulating monograph to the contextualization of those continuities, even though at times his argumentation is somewhat one-sided. It would appear that it is almost impossible to separate some of the more pointed criticism of *Das deutsche Kaiserreich* from the political situation prevailing in West Germany at the time. Both Wehler

and his critics agreed that any discussion of continuity in German history in the light of 1933 should begin with 1871. Thus, both sides agreed that one should avoid what Ralf Dahrendorf has alluded to as the "Tacitus thesis," which maintained that continuity in German history was a straight line back to Tacitus.[133] Both sides agreed that *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* had a place in the writing of German history, but there was sharp disagreement regarding the exact nature of that place, whether as a *Teildiziplin* or a new paradigm. Substantively, only Nipperdey's critique seemed to Wehler to merit careful consideration.

Continuity in German history is not and, it would appear, has not been an abstract concept. For the most part, the historians using it have avoided most narrative and explanatory fallacies in their presentation of continuity. What has driven the discussion of continuity in German history, and what seemingly continues to drive it, are political considerations. These considerations are not only academic in nature, but in West Germany are also politically oriented. The preoccupation with continuity has to do with *Vergangenheits-bewältigung*, or, coming to terms with the past. The debate continues.

NOTES

1. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1981-1918*, vol. 9 in *Deutsche Geschichte*, ed. Joachim Leuschner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1973); the English translation based on this edition is: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire 1871-1918*, trans. Kim Taylor (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg Publishers, 1985). The introduction to the German edition is much longer than the introduction to the English edition and details Wehler's theoretical orientation towards the writing of the book. Most of this detail is missing in the English edition.

2. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, 11: "Eine Geschichte des Deutschen Kaiserreichs von 1871 kann heute meines Erachtens nicht mehr im Stil der herkömmlichen Ereigniserzählung geschrieben worden." Also see Part III ("Herrschaftssystem und Politik"), section 7.2 ("Außenpolitik unter dem 'Primat der Innenpolitik"), pp. 184-185.

3. Ibid., 11 (the historical profession is decribed as continuing the conventions of portrayal and interpretation of history since the 19th century in a guild-like tradition); see also: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"*, ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. and with an intro. by Andrew Buchwalter (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984 [German edition, 1979]), 249-250.

4. Implicitly in: Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, 16:

> . . . daß auch ein starkes psychisches Bedürfnis nach 1945 bestand, die Epoche der kaiserlichen Reichseinheit zu idealisieren und von der 'Verfallsgeschichte' seit 1918, zumindest des 'Dritten Reiches' scharf abzuheben.

Explicitly, in Wehler's comments on the *Historikerstreit* of the late 1980s: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum "Historikerstreit"* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 10:

> Der Historikerstreit ist nach alledem nur in engen Grenzen eine wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung, obwohl es auch häufig um die Ergebnisse geschichtswissenschaftlicher Forschung, um deren Interpretation und politische Instrumentalisierung geht. Hauptsächlich ist er vielmehr ein durch und durch politischer Kampf um das Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik, um das politische Bewußtsein ihrer Bürger.

5. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 7.

6. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, 15:

> Bis dahin war es konservativen Historikern gelungen, eine selbstkritische Diskussion zu ersticken--man denke nur an die

Abwürgung der Militarismusdiskussion durch Gerhard Ritter oder die ursprüngliche Reaktion auf Karl-Dietrich Brachers Sezierung des Weimarer Zerfalls--, um die, verglichen mit Weimers und Hitlers Deutschland, angeblich heile Welt vor 1914 zu verteidigen.

7. Ibid., 16: "Die Mehrzahl dieser Bedingungen, wenn auch nicht alle wichtigen, ist im Kaiserreich zu finden oder als Ergebnis seiner Politik aufzufassen."

8. That *Gesellchaftsgeschichte* is paradigmatic, see: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Introduction" in *Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 8.

9. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Cologne: Kipenheuer & Witsch, 1969); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970).

10. Wehler, *Bismarck*, 25-32.

11. *Historismus* is the German word which has been variously transliterated as "historism" or "historicism." Rather than using any transliteration, however, the word *Historismus* will be used here in order to distinguish it from the meaning given to it by Karl Popper in *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), in which historicism was defined as "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history" (p. 11).

12. See, for example "Note on the term 'Historicism,' at the end of: Helen Liebel, "The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1971): 383-385.

13. Wehler, *Bismarck*, 26.

14. Wehler, "Historiography," 236.

15. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, 16; in part:

Welche Gründe auch immer für Scheu verantwortlich waren--meist handelte es sich doch um einen mehr oder weniger bewußten oder explizit gerechtfertigten Eskapismus, der die nationalsozialistische Politik als angeblich illegitimes Ergebnis der deutschen Geschichte verdrängen wollte, statt sie zuerst einmal als ein Resultat tief verwurzelter Kontinuitäten eben dieser Geschichte anzuerkennen.

Implicit in a rejection of comparability, is another notion which formed the core of *Historismus*, that is, the notion that "whatever is becoming, is right." See the discussion in Chapter 1, page 19.

16. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Eckart Kehr," in *Deutsche Historiker*, vol. 1, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 102: "traditionellen und fraglos sterilen 'Primat der Außenpolitik.'"

17. Eckart Kehr, "Class Struggle and Armament Policy in Imperial Germany," chap. in *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History*, ed. and intro. by Gordon A. Craig, trans. Grete Heina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 74.

18. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Einleitung," in *Der Primat der Innenpolitik: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutsch Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Publication of the Historischen Kommission zu Berlin Beim Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, vol. 19, Eckart Kehr, ed. and intro. by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, foreword by Hans Herzfeld (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1965), 28: "Dagegen suchte Kehr erst zur sozialgeschichtlich erfaßbaren Grundschicht der Kontinuität deutscher Geschichte vorzudringen, wo Konstanz unter dem Wirbel politischer Veränderungen vorherrschte."

19. That these essays were the "most important," see: Georg Iggers, "Deutsche Historiker in der Emigration," in *Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland: Traditionelle Positionen und gegenwärtige Aufgaben*, ed. Bernd Faulenbach (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974), 110.

20. Wehler, *Krisenherde*, 279:

> In ihrer Verbindung von kritischer Theorie und imponierender empirischer Forschung bleiben Kehrs Arbeiten, mögen sie auch Torso geblieben sein, auch heute noch ein großartiges Beispiel für eine der polititsche Lehre und drängenden Aufgaben unserer Zeit voll aufgeschlossene Geschichtswissenschaft.

21. Gordon A. Craig, "Editor's Introduction," in *Economic Interest*, Kehr, xxi; paraphrasing: Klaus Epstein, *Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert: Ein Leitfaden*, ed. Eberhard Pikart, Detlef Junker, and Gerhard Hufnagel (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 21.

22. Hans Rosenberg was born in 1904 in Hannover and in 1924 began his studies under Friedrich Meinecke in Berlin, receiving his doctorate in 1927; he habilitated under Johannes Ziekursch in Köln in 1932. In the spring of 1933, with the Nationalist Socialist accession to power, he visited London and did not return to Germany. In 1935 he went to the United States and finally obtained a position at Brooklyn College, N.Y., where he taught from 1938 to 1958. In 1959, he accepted a position at

the University of California, Berkeley. After World War II, Rosenberg frequently went back to Germany as a guest lecturer.

23. Hans Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit: Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa*, Publication of the Historischen Kommission zu Berlin Beim Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, vol. 24, Publication *Zur Geschichte der Industrialisierung*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967), 260:

> In Wirklichkeit fehlte es der Bismarckschen Außenpolitik keinesweges an Kontinuität. Was sie trotz gegensätzlicher Taktik und Ausdrucksphasen zusammenhielt und ihre Dynamik als eine sinnvolle Einheit erscheinen läßt, war ihre Abhängigkeit vom Primat der militanten konservativ-autoritären Innenpolitik im Rahmen der Bismarckschen Gesamtpolitik.

Further to this, please note that in the title of Rosenberg's book "*Große*" is spelled "*Grosse*," while elsewhere it has been spelled as "*Große*."

24. Rosenberg, 20.

25. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Vorwort," in *Sozialgeschichte Heute: Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 20:

> Ungeachtet einiger theoretischer und empirischer Schwierigkeiten, die Rosenberg übrigens als erster eingeräumt hätte, eröffnete das Buch doch so viele neue Perspektiven und Interpretations -möglichkeiten--sei es zum industriellen Wachstum oder zur Parteien--und Verbändegeschichte, zum politisch organisierten Anti-semitismus oder zur allgemeinen "Entliberalisierung" seit den 1870er Jahren--,daß es auch in dieser Hinsicht eine Sonderstellung gewann . . . . Die Überzeugungskraft, die von diesen Studien ausgeht, hat sich inzwischen in einer ganze Reihe neurer Monographien, aber auch in diesem Band niedergeschlagen, und es dürfte keine zu gewagte Prognose sein, daß Rosenbergs "Große Depression" für die Beschäftigung mit der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts ein "Essential" bleiben wird. Das aber kann man nicht häufig von einem Buch sagen."

In 1980, Wehler said the same things about Rosenberg in his essay on "Hans Rosenberg," in: *Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 276.

26. Iggers, 110.

27. Hans Mommsen, "Die Herausforderung durch die moderne Sozialwissenschaft" in Faulenbach, 144.

28. Roger Fletcher, "Recent Developments in West German Historiography: The Bielefeld School and Its Critics," *German Studies Review* 7 (October 1984): 457. Since Wehler is a Professor of History at the University of Bielefeld, some have given the name 'Bielefeld School' to those German historians who take a social historical approach to the writing of history.

29. Wehler, "Vorwort," in *Historische Sozialwissenschaft*, 8; also: Wehler, "Historiography," in *Observations*, 231-232.

30. Wehler, "Vorwort," in *Historische Sozialwissenschaft*, 7: "Es entspannen sich lebhafte Auseinandersetzungen darüber, ob Anleihen bei den systematischen Sozialwissenschaften unabweisbar seien oder ob es ausreiche, die Verstehenslehre des klassischen Historismus zu modernisieren."

31. Ibid., 8: "den Nachbarwissenschaften, wie z.B. der Soziologie und Ökonomie."

32. Ibid: ". . . womöglich eine Fusion in Richtung auf eine Historische Sozialwissenschaft."

33. Ibid:

> An dieser Stelle ist als ein entscheidender Gesichtspunkt noch einmal hervorzuheben,daß die Lösung weithin ungeklärter, aber außerordentlich wichtiger Probleme es erfordert, sich auf den Weg einer Historischen Sozialwissenschaft zu begeben. Denn die historischen Konstellationen sozialer Ungleichheit, insbesondere die Entwicklung und Bedeutung marktbedingter Klassen, die Etappen des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums, vor allem Inhalt und Folgen der zyklischen Verlaufmuster des Industriekapitalismus, die Fragen der Historischen Demographie und Mobilitätsforschung, die soziokulturellen Dimensionen des Alltagslebens und die Legitimationsprobleme politischer Regime--all diese Fragen, deren genaue Analyse nicht für die Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, die Politik- und Kulturgeschichte, sondern auch für die Gesellschaftsgeschichte als Paradigma zeitgemäßer historischer Synthese hohe Priorität besitzt, können nach meiner Ansicht am ehesten von einer Historischen Sozialwissenschaft geklärt werden, welche den unverzichtbaren Qualitätstandards einer soliden empirischen Fundierung und einer überzeugenden theoretischen Erklärung gerecht werden muß.

34. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age,"* ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. Andrew Buchwalter (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 230.

35. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Was ist Gesellschaftsgeschichte?" in *Aus der Geschichte lernen? Essays*, by Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 116:

> Französische Historiker argumentieren tendenziell ganz ähnlich. Nur war hier der Begriff der 'historie totale' mit extrem hohen Ansprüchen befrachtet. Und nicht nur das: Der Totalitätbegriff blieb weithin undefiniert, er wurde stillschweigend als erstrebenswerte, integrations- und konsensfähige Leitvorstellung behandelt.

36. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, 12.

37. Wehler, "Vorwort," in *Historische Sozialwissenschaft*, 9.

38. Georg Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography*, revised edition (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), 196-197.

39. Ernst Schulin, "Die Frage nach der Zukunft," in *Geschichte Heute: Positionen, Tendenzen und Probleme*, ed. G. Schulz (Göttingen, 1973), 133, quoted by Klaus Hildebrand, "Geschichte oder 'Gesellschafts-geschichte'? Die Notwendigkeit einer politischen Geschichtsschreibung von den internationalen Beziehungen," *Historische Zeitschrift* 223 (1976): 341:

> Die Geschichtswissenschaft muß die Bedeutung der jeweiligen besonderen Situation, die einzelmenschlichen Wunschvorstellungen und Entscheidungen und nicht zuletzt die von überraschenden 'zufälligen' Ereignissen außerordentlich hochschätzen. Keine andere Wissenschaft nimmt ihr die Ausbalancierung dieser Größen ab.

40. Hildebrand, "Geschichte oder 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte'?", 351-352.

41. Ibid., 350.

42. Ibid., 356: "kaum sinnvoll angewandt zu werden."

43. Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich*, trans., Anthony Feathergill (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1973 [German edition: *Deutsche Außenpolitik, 1933-1945: Kalkül oder Dogma?*, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1970)], 1. Indeed, Hans-Ulrich Wehler was one of those whom Hildebrand thanked in the Introduction.

44. Ibid., 136.

45. Hildebrand, "Geschichte oder 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte'?", 329; in regard to the Lamprecht controversy, see: Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, revised ed., (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 197-201; Helen P. Liebel, "Philosophical Idealism in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1859-1914," *History and Theory* 3 (1964): 316-330; Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Geist*

und Geschichte vom Deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 2 (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1951), 227-243.

46. Hildebrand, 329, quoting H. Böhme, "Politik und Ökonomie in der Reichsgründungs- und späten Bismarckzeit," in M. Stürmer, ed., *Das kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft, 1870-1918* (Düsseldorf, 1970), 26.

47. Ibid., 330.

48. Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, 199.

49. Liebel, "Philosophical Idealism," 330.

50. In regard to the *Historikerstreit*, Hans-Ulrich Wehler's booklength contribution was *Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum "Historikerstreit"* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988). This examination of the *Historikerstreit* mixed both historical analysis with personal observations regarding the background, academic qualifications, personal interactions, and political affiliations of the historians with whom Wehler took issue. In response to Wehler's "*Groβpolemik*," Thomas Nipperdey wrote that, in effect, what he feared was how the polarization of the historical profession itself and the high emotions involved would affect colleagues whom he respected as well as younger historians. See: Thomas Nipperdey, "Wehlers Gesellschaftsgeschichte," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft* 14 (1988), 403.

51. Wehler, *Krisenherde*, 9: "'Wer Geschichte, inbesondere Geschichte der Gegenwart schreibt, hat die Pflicht politischer Pädagogik.'"

52. Ibid., 10-11.

53. Andreas Hillgruber, "Politische Geschichte in moderner Sicht," *Historische Zeitschrift* 216 (1973): 529-552.

54. Ibid., 531, citing Hans Rosenberg, *Probleme der deutschen Sozialgeschichte* (Frankfurt a.M., 1969), 147:

> . . . daβ in den letzten Jahren die sogenannte Sozialgeschichte für viele ein nebuloser Sammelname für alles, was in der Geschichtswissenschaft der Bundesrepublik als wünschenwert und fortschrittlich angesehen wird, geworden ist.

55. Hildebrand, "Geschichte oder 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte'?", 339 (linking this with the "true theories" of Karl Marx), 348 (linking the concept of organized capitalism with the "Marxist theoretician" Rudolf Hilferding); Hillgruber, 529-530 (it is an open question whether the interpretations are to be linked with "doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism" or whether they are to be linked with the "neo-Marxist" "criticial theories" of the "Frankfurt School").

56. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in West Germany Today," in *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"*, ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. Andrew Buchwalter (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984 [German, 1979]), 249.

57. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Moderne Politikgeschichte oder 'Große Politik der Kabinette?'", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft* 1 (1975): 344-369.

58. Ibid., 348-349.

59. Wehler, "Historiography," in *Observations*, 250.

60. Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies Since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 164.

61. Wehler, *Entsorgung*, 21: "Die Irritationen jener Freiburger Jahre haben wahrscheinlich den anfangs eher nationalliberal-linkskonservativen Mann [i.e., Hillgruber] in einen reizbaren, überzeugten Konservativen zu verwandeln begonnen."

62. Hillgruber, "Politische Geschichte," 531: "als bloße Tarnung für eindeutige Indoktrination."

63. Turner, Jr., 164.

64. Wolfgang Wippermann, "Friedrich Meineckes *Die deutsche Katastrophe*: Ein Versuch zur deutschen Vergangenheitsbewältigung," in *Friedrich Meinecke Heute: Bericht über ein Gedenk-Colloquium zu seinem 25. Todestag am 5. und 6. April 1979*, ed. Michael Erbe (Berlin: Coloquium Verlag, 1981), 109-110.

65. Friedrich Meinecke, "Die Deutschen Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen: in *Friedrich Meinecke: Werke*, vol. 8, *Autobiographische Schriften*, ed. with an intro. by Eberhard Kessel (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1969), 108.

66. Hans Mommsen, "Historical Scholarship in Transition: the Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Daedalus* 100 (1971): 489.

67. William Carr, "The Hitler Image in the Last Half-Century," in *Aspects of the Third Reich.*, ed. H. W. Koch (London: Macmillian, 1985), 467.

68. Lothar Gall, "Einleitung," in *Das Bismarck-Problem in der Geschichtsschreibung nach 1945*, ed. Lothar Gall, Neue Wisssenschaftliche Bibliothek, no. 42 (Cologne: Kiepenheuser & Witsch, 1971), 12.

69. On Fritz Fischer's methodology, see: Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, 267.

70. Ibid; see also, Wehler, "Historiography," 233.

71. Hans Mommsen, "Historical Scholarship," 492. Also, see: John A. Moses, *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography* (London: George Prior Publishers, 1975).

72. Fletcher, 465.

73. Hans Mommsen, "Haupttendenzen nach 1945 und in der Ära des Kalten Krieges," in Faulenbach, 120.

74. Jörn Rüsen, "Theory of History in the Development of West German Historical Studies: A Reconsideration and Outlook," *German Studies Review* 7 (February 1984): 14; note, italics in original.

75. Ibid., 16.

76. Wehler, "Historiography," 234.

77. Konrad H. Jarausch, "Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm," *Journal of Modern History* 55,2 (June 1983): 270.

78. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 7.

79. Thomas Nipperdey, "1933 and the Continuity of German History," in Koch, 493-494; Nipperdey discussed other possibilities, but tentatively rejected them in favour of beginning any analysis of continuity with the Kaiserreich.

80. Thomas Nipperdey, "Wehlers 'Kaiserreich'. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung," in *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur neuren Geschichte*, Thomas Nipperdey (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976): 360-389; originally in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für historische Sozialwissenschaft 1 (1975): 539-560.*

81. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Kritik und kritische Antikritik," *Historische Zeitschrift* 225 (1977): 347-384.

82. Wehler, The German Empire, 6.

83. Richard J. Evans, *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 36.

84. Fletcher, 462.

85. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 6.

86. Ibid., 7.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., 91.

89. Ibid., 91-94. In the notes, in both the English and the German edition (English: note 91, page 255; German: note 25, p. 247), Wehler pointed out that the phrase "negative integration" is not to be found in sources contemporaneous with Bismarck. Wehler cited: Wolfgang Sauer, "Das Problem das deutschen Nationalstaates," in *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, 428-436, ed. by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, vol. 10 in *Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966). Sauer, however, never used the phrase "negative integration." Sauer consistently used the word, "*Kampfkurs*," to describe Bismarck's domestic policy (429, 430, 433). Sauer's list of *Reichsfeinden* was marginally more limited than that of Wehler's; Sauer's list read as follows: "Klerikale [i.e., the Centre Party], Welfen, Polen, Sozialdemokratten" (430). Interestingly enough, this list almost parallels a list in Gall's biography of Bismarck. Gall wrote that after the election of 10 January 1874,

> the Centre Party, with its unreservedly oppositional stance, had shot from sixty-three to ninety-one seats. Together with the Poles, the Guelfs, the Danes, the Alsace-Lorrainers and the Social Democrats, the 'protest parties' that the leaders of the Reich believed could not be included in any of their parliamentary calculations . . . now constituted a bloc of 134 seats. (Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary*, vol. 2, *1871-1898*, trans. by J. A. Underwood [London: Allen & Unwin, 1986], 65)

In other words, those groups on both lists corresponded to political groups who were either in part or wholly opposed to Bismarck.

90. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 94.

91. Ibid., 155.

92. Helmuth Stoecker and Peter Sebald, "Enemies of the Colonial Idea," translated by Lewis H. Green, in *Germans in the Tropics: Essays in German Colonial History*, ed. by Arthur J. Knoll and Lewis H. Green, no. 24 in Contributions to Comparative Colonial Studies, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 64.

93. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 109.

94. Ibid., 107; the German is from: Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*, 112; both cited *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*, ed. W. Mommsen (Munich, 1960), 84. In going beyond Wehler's brief reference, Mommsen's reference was to the 1899 Hamburg resolutions of the *Deutschen-sozialen Reformpartei*. According to Mommsen, this group represented an "increasing radicalization towards a pronounced racial anti-Semitism" (Mommsen, 83). Resolution 3 reads as follows:

> Dank der Entwicklung unserer modernen Vekehrsmittel dürfte die Judenfrage im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts zur Weltfrage werden und als solche von den anderen Völkern gemeinsam und endgültig durch völlige Absonderung und (wenn die Notwehr es gebietet) schließliche Vernichtung des Judenvolkes gelöst werden (Mommsen, 84).

Bismarck's association with anti-Semitism is ambiguous. In 1880-81, Bismarck entered into a "tactical alliance" with the anti-Semitic parties since they had a common foe (Pulzer, 92). Furthermore, Bismarck, like many well-off German Jews, disliked the influx of Jews from the East and particularly disliked Jews associated with leftist politics. According to Stern, beginning in the 1880s, the German government began a "policy of covert discrimination against Jews . . . that the civil service continued under William II" (Stern, 528). See: Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 510-528.

95. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 94ff. For a criticism of this point of view, see: Geoff Eley, *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986). In both the "Introduction," as well as in several essays, Eley questioned the suppositions of "Wehler's influential textbook *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*" (11). For Eley, the whole "idea of authoritarian continuities . . . begged more questions than it resolved" (11). For example, Eley's assessment of the relationship between the naval bill and Sammlungspolitik is striking; basically, while there was a commonality of interests between the proponents of a large navy and the large agricutural interests, the naval bill actually threatened the league and to posit a direct correlation between the two is to allow "an arbitrary conceptual framework to become superimposed upon a complicated configuration of economic and political issues" (144).

96. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 97.

97. Ibid., 99, citing, Walther Rathenau, *An Deutschlands Jugend* (Berlin, 1918), 100.

98. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 99.

99. For Eley, while not denying "linear continutities," this whole procees should have concentrated more on the "unevenness of the process from a less inevitablist conception of Nazism's deeper origins" (12).

100. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 10-14.

101. Ibid., 52-64. Lothar Gall (in: "Bismarck und der Bonapartismus," *Historische Zeitschrift* 223 [1976]: 618-637) has

argued that the whole concept of "Bonapartism" has been stretched by the left and the right so as to make it capable of meaning anything:

> Es bedarf kaum eines besonderes Hinweises, daß hier, von der Bonapartismusdeutung der konservativen Neoabsolutisten wie von der in vieler Hinsicht parallelen ihrer libaralen und demokratischen Gegner, jene Elemente gleichsam bereitgestellt worden sind, die es seiner ganz eklektisch verfahrenden modernen Bonapartismustheorie erlaubten, den Begriff des Bonapartismus nahezu beliebig auszuweiten. (629)

However, both Gall and Pflanze noted that "Bonapartism" was a term contemporaneous with Bismarck; see: Otto Pflanze, "Bismarcks Herrschaftstechnick als Problem der gegenwärtigen Historiographie," *Historische Zeitschrift* 234 (1982): 561-599

102. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 66, 68, 69.

103. Ibid., 155-156. In the notes to both the English (note 14, page 259) and the German (note 14, page 252) editions, the reference is to Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland*, vol. 1, *Die altpreußische Tradition (1740-1890)* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1954, 23. The correct pagination to Ritter's work should be 13 and not 23. Also, see: V. R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of an International Debate 1861-1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Berghahn pointed out that immediately after World War II, even though Friedrich Meinecke and Hans Herzfeld traced Prussian militarism back to Frederick the Great, they also placed militarism in a European context, which was a "most unpopular approach in 1946" (52). Berghahn went on to write that Ritter's approach was to advance a very narrow definition of militarism and to theorize that the decisive shift in the civilian-military balance occurred immediately before the First World War (56).

104. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 156.

105. Ibid., 127.

106. Ibid., 159-160. Unpublished research by Ulrich Trumpener, however, shows that many members of the officer corps who were of noble rank were ennobled when attaining that rank rather than having been born into the nobility.

107. Ibid., 142. Wehler did not give the total revenue for the imperial budget, but this can be determined from a table on page 141 by dividing the percentage of duties on agricultural produce as a percentage of total imperial revenue for the year into the revenues of the duties themselves. Thus, in 1879, if the duties on agricultural produce amounted to 13.2 million marks, and if this was 11.8 per cent of the imperial revenues for the year, then 11.8 per cent divided into 13.2 million marks yields a total of 111.86 million marks for the total of imperial revenues for the year 1879. The table on page 142 does not

give any figures for 1880, only 1879 and 1881; the percentage increase of 687 per cent is the increase from 1889 to 1913 (or, an increase from 111.86 million marks in 1879 to 880.21 million marks in 1913) and the 370 per cent increase is the percentage increase from 1881 to 1913 (or an increase from 185.87 million marks in 1881 to 880.21 million marks in 1913). Revenues for the period only increased from year to year, thus the percentage increase from 1880 to 1913 must lie somewhere in between the base of 1879 and 1881.

108. Fritz Terhalle, "Geschichte der deutschen öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft von Beginn des 19. Jahrhundrets bis zum Schlusse des zweiten Weltkrieges," chap. in *Handbuch der Finanzwissenschaft*, vol. 1, second ed., ed. Wilhelm Gerloff and Fritz Neumark (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1952), 279.

109. Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: The Ashfield Press, 1980), 358.

110. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 163.

111. Golo Mann, "Plädoyer für die historische Erzählung," in *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, Theorie der Geschichte: Beiträge zur Historik, vol. 3 (Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 46-47:

> Aber der alte Bertrand Russell schreibt im Rückblick: 'Ich lebte in des Kaisers Deutschland und sah dort die fortschrittlichen Kräfte am Werk, welche die besten Chancen hatten, bald an die Macht zu kommen. Des Kaisers Deutschland war nur säbelrasselnd und etwas komisch. Aber es gab dort mehr Freiheit, als es heute, außerhalb von England und Skandinavien, irgendwo auf Erden gibt.' So Russell in unseren fünfziger Jahren, rückblickend.

112. Ibid.

113. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 200.

114. Ibid., 198.

115. Ibid., 193.

116. Mann, 50-51.

117. Wehler, *The German Empire 1871-1918*, 197-200.

118. Nipperdey, "Wehlers," in *Gesellschaft*, 364.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., 366.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., 370.

123. Ibid., 388.

124. Ibid., 364-365.

125. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 82.

126. Nipperdey, "1933" in Koch, 501.

127. Ibid.

128. See, Ian Kershaw: *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 2nd ed., (London: Edward Arnold, 1989).

129. J. C. G. Röhl, *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History*, Problems and Perspectives in History, ed. Hugh J. Kearney (London: Longman, 1970), 33.

130. Ibid., xiii.

131. Wehler, *The German Empire*, 194.

132. Ibid., 115.

133. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967 [German edition: 1965]), 17 and 25.

Chapter 3

The *Historikerstreit*: Singularity or Comparability, Continuity or Discontinuity, and *Geschichtsbewußtsein*

In the spring and summer of 1986, during the period of preparation for the up-coming 1987 West German federal elections, West German historians and other academics entered into a rather strident controversy regarding the singularity and uniqueness of the National Socialist era in German history. The controversy has been called the *Historikerstreit*. In contrast to other disputes in the past, which for the most part had been argued in scholarly journals, the *Historikerstreit* was publicly debated in the West German press, radio, and television. Two collections of documents dealing with the *Historikerstreit*, both published in 1987, attest to the public nature of the controversy, since virtually all of the documents in either anthology were taken from articles in the popular press, letters to the editor, transcripts of radio or television interviews, or excerpts from books aimed at the general reading public (as opposed to those aimed at the academic community).[1]

The problem of "coming to terms with the past" (*Vergangenheits-bewältigung*) in regard to National Socialism has been a concern in what was then West Germany since 1945, and the *Historikerstreit* is a

reflection of the diverse positions of West German historians concerning historical consciousness (*Geschichtsbewußtsein*) in West Germany.

The question of *Geschichtsbewußtsein*, which encompasses the *Historikerstreit*, includes at least three dimensions of interpretation of National Socialism: 1) historical-philosophical, 2) political-ideological, and 3) moral. In addition to these dimensions, the argumentation also became personal, with some of the participants objecting not only to how a position was formulated (in effect, form over substance), but also who was doing the formulating.[2] In an article on the *Historikerstreit*, Peter Stadler observed: "Historical disputes have their tradition in German historical scholarship and nearly always also reflect a connection to a political position."[3]

The *Historikerstreit* has been a debate mostly within West Germany itself. Even though the discussion has been concentrated there, foreign observations generally have been in the form of commentary, although this is not to say that foreign historians have not taken "sides" in their commentary. For example, in the 284 item bibliography in *Geschichtswende?*, only five items are in a foreign language (one in Russian and the rest in English, of which one is by a German author).[4] Furthermore, Charles S. Maier has characterized the controversy as one that involves the West German historical profession regarding questions of historical consciousness, political and historical orientation, and historical methodology.[5]

The *Historikerstreit*, furthermore, has been a West German controversy rather than one which also involved East Germany. After the division of Germany in 1945 and the subsequent creation of the Federal

Republic of Germany (BRD) and the German Democratic Republic (DDR), it was West Germany which specifically identified with the totality of German history, including the period of National Socialism, and paid restitution and reparations to the victims of National Socialism.

East Germany, however, had embraced a Marxist ideology which enabled it to repudiate those parts of the German past which were not "progressive." Thus, the DDR in effect divorced itself from National Socialism since the DDR had been by definition a constitutional socialist state and Fascism was an outgrowth of monopolistic capitalism.[6] For East German historians, for example, the fabric of "real socialism on German soil" was not to be seen as a history of Prussia or Saxony, but rather as a history of class conflicts, which in turn "led the progressive forces of the German people in their totality . . . towards the realization of societal progress on German soil."[7] In a commentary on the *Historikerstreit*, the DDR historian, Gerhard Lozek, chided the "right-wing BRD conservative historians" for concentrating on "fatalistic inevitability" rather than emulating DDR historians in following "Marxist-Leninist historical scholarship."[8] In keeping with the East German party-line, Lozek wrote that the blame for National Socialism was to be found in the workings of "finance capital, the military leadership, and the fascist leadership clique." Lozek was careful to distinguish between the "German people" and the "fascist rulers," and cited Joseph Stalin to bolster this observation. Lozek also maintained that the thesis of "collective guilt" has been maintained in West Germany in order to deflect attention from those who were really guilty (i.e., finance capital, etc.).[9] In Hans-Ulrich

Wehler's opinion, historiography in the DDR "has been subordinated to a state-ordained Marxism-Leninism."[10] In all fairness to how history had been approached in the DDR, however, it should be said that historical scholarship in the DDR oftentimes proceeded in exactly the same manner as it did in the West.[11] Even up to the end of its existence, the DDR still seemed to be fairly inflexible regarding any attempt to associate itself with either National Socialism or even the Weimar Republic. The DDR, however, apparently was more flexible regarding its association with the imperial German past, as may be evidenced by its partial or complete "rehabilitation" of such German luminaries as Martin Luther, Frederick the Great, and even Otto von Bismarck.[12]

The antecedents of the *Historikerstreit* lie in both the political and academic realms, and the two are inter-twined.

By the 1980s in the BRD, as in the West in general, there was a shift to a more conservative trend (*Tendenzwende*) in politics. This shift began during the 1970s, for example, with a growing antagonism towards foreign workers in the BRD as well as the introduction of the *Berufsverbot* in 1972 under the SPD government of Willy Brandt.[13] In 1977, Helmut Schmidt's SPD government strongly reacted against an increase in terrorism by the Red Army Faction in the BRD.[14] Furthermore, in 1979, Chancellor Schmidt agreed to the two-track missile strategy proposed by the Americans and agreed to allow the stationing of nuclear missiles on BRD soil.[15] After the fall of the SPD-FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition in 1982, the accession of Helmut Kohl of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) as

Chancellor in a coalition government with the FDP was a clear sign that this "shift to the right" had occurred at the national level.[16]

The shift to the right had been accelerated by the public's reaction to a decline in the economy due to the energy crises of the 1970s. Because of these crises, nuclear power plants proliferated, and the Green Party was formed, partially in a reaction against nuclear energy; the Green party fractured both the political scene and the normal way of doing business in the Bundestag.[17] Interestingly enough, it was the view of Jürgen Habermas that economic crises provoke political crises of legitimacy and that the reaction to such a crisis (or series of crises) is the rise of such oppositional movements as ecological movements, religious revivalism, and parts of the women's movement.[18]

The ambiguity of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and *Geschichtsbewußtsein* was brought out in 1985 in the incident at the military (Wehrmacht) cemetery in Bitburg.[19] In 1984, Helmut Kohl had been rebuffed from participating in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy. In 1985, in order to symbolize the reconciliation of former enemies on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the German surrender, Kohl invited American President Reagan to the Bitburg cemetery. However, when it was discovered that the cemetery contained the graves of forty-nine members of the Waffen SS, which the Nuremberg Tribunal had declared to be a "criminal" organization, what was supposed to have been a celebration of reconciliation turned into a public relations disaster. The discussions about Bitburg revealed the ambiguity between individual and collective

responsibility and guilt; Charles Maier used the term "*Bitburg history*" to refer to a "multiple muddying of moral categories and historical agents."[20] Rolf Kosiek remarked that the incident at the Bitburg cemetery could probably have "laid the perhaps unknown grounds for many of the statements in the *Historikerstreit*."[21]

Interestingly enough, in regard to *Geschichtsbewußtsein*, the fringes of the political spectrum of the extreme left and right seem to meet, for example, in their common rejection of any BRD affiliation with NATO or the Atlantic alliance. Common to both extremes is anti-Americanism.[22] The rightists are looking for the re-establishment of a German position in Middle Europe while some on the left have stated that de-Nazification "was the counterpart to the integration of West Germany into the capitalist world market."[23]

In 1982 the Kohl government decided to establish a museum of the history of the BRD in Bonn and a museum of German History in Berlin.[24] Michael Stürmer, a Professor of History at the University of Erlangen, one of the participants in the *Historikerstreit*, and a some-time advisor to Kohl, was a strong proponent of the idea of national museums.[25] The museum proposal raised the issue of national identity: who were and are the Germans? Objections to the museum proposals, however, came from both the left and the right. The SPD said that the "plans were, among other things, a strong accentuation of CDU governmental politics."[26] On the right, Hellmut Diwald, an Erlangen historian, criticized the proposed museums on the ground that they would be monuments that would enshrine the division of Germany.[27] Even though the museum proposal by the government was originally supposed to be scholarly and

non-partisan,[28] it became more a "question of political power"[29] than a question of history. This was an example of the politicization of both history and historians in the BRD.

The political question which confronted those writing in the *Historikerstreit* was one of national identity and who was going to define it. It would be too simplistic to ask whether history should be written from a CDU/CSU point of view, a SPD point of view, something in between, or something harkening back to the ideal of historical objectivity. Thomas Nipperdey believed that objectivity is the goal of historical scholarship and is to be achieved through a methodology that is grounded in Karl Popper's ideal of "intersubjective verification."[30] Wehler, on the other hand, argued against an appeal to Popper's ideal of intersubjective verification. Wehler felt that Nipperdey was using intersubjective verification as a mask to mount an ideolologically motivated attack on the results of the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt school.[31] However, as Volker Berghahn has pointed out, West Germans who "started their university education in the restive 1960s, found the sociological and 'structural' explanations of the Third Reich more plausible" than "the propagation of myths and legends" of the older generation. This rejection, in turn, "almost inevitably pushed the younger generation towards the Left."[32] It would be no exaggeration to say that a specific orientation towards continuity in German history had political consequences in the BRD.[33]

By the late 1970s, BRD historical scholarship on National Socialism was divided roughly into the intentionalists and the structuralists (or functionalists). The intentionalists maintained that

National Socialism is understandable only by comprehending the intentions of the leadership, and specifically stressed the centrality of Hitler as a source of legitimacy; the major proponents of this approach were Karl Dietrich Bracher, Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, and Eberhard Jäckel.[34] The structuralists, however, maintained that one had to go beyond intentionality and study the diffused and contending centres of power in the Third Reich in order to understand the nature of National Socialism; proponents of this approach were Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen.[35] Neither of these approaches is in any way apologetic, even though the structuralist approach sometimes has been labelled as "revisionist."[36] For Wolfgang Mommsen, in the 1960s and 1970s the "revisionist" position had achieved a "hegemonial position" in German historical scholarship.[37] To some extent, the division between the intentionalists and the structuralists may be reflected in the problem of continuity--or, as the case may be, discontinuity--in German history, that is, the problem of fitting National Socialism into the context of German history.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Thomas Nipperdey has written that the concept of continuity *per se* is a misnomer when applied to the sweep of history. Rather, it would be correct to speak of strands of continuities which reform and refine themselves under different historical conditions. For example, one could properly speak about the continuities in the economic, social, political, or military fabric of German history which existed from 1871 to 1918 and then found some fruition in 1933.[38] Furthermore, the *terminus ad quem* of these continuities would be the era of Bismarck and to go further into the

past--for example, *From Luther to Hitler by* William Montgomery McGovern--would be "unhistorical."[39] At least since 1945, virtually no German historian has traced the roots of National Socialism further back in time than the unification of the Germanies under Bismarck in 1871.[40]

In speaking of continuities, however, it is easier to start from a structuralist perspective than an intentionalist one. If National Socialism is conceived of as having been a plenitude of contending and conflicting centres which vied for power, then it is easier to find continuities in the elites of German society which found a place in National Socialism than it is to find significant continuities in the strands of German history which found a place in the thought of Hitler. From an intentionalist perspective, for example, Andreas Hillgruber compared Germany's war aims in the First and Second World Wars and found that the "qualitative difference" between the two was Hitler's "racial-ideological war of annihilation."[41]

Since there were both continuities and discontinuities between Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany and National Socialism, the question is posed concerning the singularity of National Socialism within the fabric of German history. To turn this statement into a question, one might ask the following: to what extent should German history be defined by the experience of National Socialism and its horrors, in particular, Auschwitz? For the West Germans, this was important since they realized that more than forty years of German history have elapsed since the end of the war as compared to the twelve years of National Socialism in Germany.

However, as Wolfgang Mommsen has pointed out, the "hegemonial position" of revisionism has been declining over the past few years since it had pushed its examination of "anti-democratic elements of the German tradition too far." This decline marked a "change of direction" for historical scholarship. For Mommsen, Nipperdey was the chief spokesperson of this "change of direction." Nipperdey turned against Hans-Ulrich Wehler's "one-sided" emphasis on the continuity of German history centring on 1933 and proposed investigating those continuities which would have as their subject "the current realities of the Federal Republic [of Germany]."[42]

In 1979, Hellmut Diwald wrote *Geschichte der Deutschen*, in which he allotted two pages to the Holocaust--since it "could not be captured in words"--but thirty pages to Allied atrocities against the Germans after the war.[43] Diwald's avowed purpose was to "confront the taboo" that somehow everything in the German past was either wrong or had gone wrong; the book was tremendously popular, and the first printing was for 100,000 copies.[44] The second edition was revised because of the numerous objections to this unbalanced treatment. The revision, however, consisted of an addendum of two and a half pages and Eley has characterized the book as coming from an "unrepentent nationalist perspective."[45] For Eley, Diwald "anticipated the discourse of Bitburg and the *Historikerstreit*."[46]

Even if Diwald's treatment was too one-sided for many scholars, the concern that German national identity was somehow reducible to National Socialism was a debatable issue. The whole museum debate--with scholars lined up on their respective sides--was concerned with putting

National Socialism into a historical perspective; in effect, it was to be a demonstration that German history was not reducible to the years 1933-45. Part of this mood is reflected in the title of one of Hillgruber's short books, *Enough Finally about National Socialism and the Second World War?*[47]

The struggles over structuralism versus intentionalism, comparability versus singularity, and above all *Geschichtsbewußtsein*, all came to a head in 1986 within the context of the preparations for the upcoming federal elections. Jürgen Habermas, as his "contribution to the SPD effort in the electoral campaign,"[48] publicly criticized the works of three prominent West German historians: Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer, and Andreas Hillgruber. In his article in *Die Zeit* of 11 July 1986, "A Type of Damage Control: The Apologetic Tendencies in the Writing of Contemporary German History,"[49] Habermas, who is not a professional historian but a philosopher and social scientist, justified his criticism of historians on the ground that Hillgruber's book, for one, was brought out as a popular publication, addressed to the general reading public and not the specialist.[50] For Habermas, this meant that the book was open to criticism by the non-specialist. The writings of Nolte and Stürmer which were criticized by Habermas originally appeared completely or in part in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*).

Stürmer, born in 1938, is a Professor of Modern History at Erlangen. In addition to his academic position, Stürmer also has been closely associated with the CDU. On 25 April 1986, the *FAZ* published his "History in a Country Without History."[51] Stürmer argued that, in effect, German history had to be given a positive content lest the past

be used by forces of the right or the left for political purposes. He wrote that "in a land without memory, anything is possible."[52] Stürmer believed that the BRD should continue its Western and NATO orientation, but this could be accomplished only by overcoming the political extremes of the left and the right. Extremists on both sides wanted to revert to the old German idea of the *Sonderweg*, which was a way of seeing Germany as being politically and morally distinct from the West.[53] Gordon Craig criticized Stürmer's style as being "highly mannered," which in turn blurred both his "precision and definition."[54] Nevertheless, in Stürmer's article he seemed quite clear when he wrote that "the search after a lost history . . . is morally legitimate and politically necessary."[55]

Nolte, born in 1923, took up his current position as Professor of Modern History at the Free University in West Berlin in 1973. He left his position at Marburg because he felt that he had not received enough support from a left-wing colleague after having been abusively criticized by militant students in the late 1960s.[56] His best known work in English is *The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism* (1966; German, 1963: *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*; indeed, it was in this work that Nolte found that the essence of Fascism was anti-Marxism[57]). According to Craig, even though Nolte is a Professor of History, "he has always been more of a philosopher than a historian, with a penchant for making startling comparisons or hypotheses, often in the form of questions, which therefore do not require an underpinning of fact."[58] Eley has characterized Nolte as an "idiosyncratic conservative historian."[59] As

far as labelling and characterization is concerned, Nolte himself--who would probably like to be above such things--has noted that in the 1960s he was linked with the left and today he is linked with the right.[60]

On 6 June 1986, the *FAZ* published Nolte's "A Past which will not die: A Speech which was written but could not be given."[61] Originally, Nolte had prepared this article as a presentation at the 1986 Römerberg Colloquium in Frankfurt; however, even though the title implies that there was censorship involved and he was being prevented from giving the presentation, he actually just decided not to make the presentation.[62]

Nolte's thesis was that National Socialism and Hitler himself should be placed within the context of European history rather than just the context of German history. This widening of the contextual boundary would facilitate an "illumination of differences [*zur Herstellung von Unterschieden*]."[63] Specifically, Nolte raised the possibility of a comparison of the similarity of the National Socialist extermination of the Jewish people to the Turkish treatment of the Armenians, the Soviet Gulag, and the Soviet example of "social extermination." Even though Nolte pointed out that social extermination is qualitatively different from racial extermination, he nevertheless felt that in these similarities there was probably a "causal nexus."[64] For Nolte, the past must become more visible in its complexity since for today's Germany a black and white representation of the past is no longer adequate.[65]

Prior to the 1986 article, Nolte published "Between Myth and Revisionism?" in *Aspects of the Third Reich*.[66] Nolte argued in this

article that there were legitimate reasons for the negative image of the Third Reich: it caused the bloodiest war known to man, it was "old fashioned and reactionary," its policy of extermination was "without precedent in its motivation and execution," and its leaders were virtually cartoon caricatures.[67] Nolte, however, asked whether the history of the Third Reich was in need of revision, and, if so, what kind of revision it should be. After about fifteen pages of complex reasoning (his style and terminology are sometimes convoluted and unclear), Nolte stated that there were three "postulates" for a historio-graphic representation of the Third Reich. Firstly, the Third Reich should be investigated in a "historico-genetic manner" instead of being compared structurally; thus, the Third Reich should not be isolated within the structure of Fascism but subsumed under categories of analysis such as the Industrial or Russian revolutions. Secondly, there should be no "instrumentalization"[68] of the Third Reich; for Nolte, this meant that one should not criticize the Third Reich when one really wants to criticize the BRD. Thirdly, the Third Reich should not be "demonized"; while anything human is neither entirely good nor entirely evil, "a thorough investigation and penetrating analysis will not eliminate the singularity of the Third Reich, but they will make it appear nevertheless as part of the history of mankind . . . ."[69] Hanno Helbing, head of editorial features for the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, characterized the revisionists' attempts to create a new myth as an attempt to demythologize the period of National Socialism; however, Helbing agreed with Nipperdey that 1933 marked not only a rising and radicalization of existing continuities, but a new combination of

continuities.[70] In 1983, in commenting on Hans Kohn's *The Mind of Germany*, Theodore Hamerow said that "there was hope for the redemption of Germany after all, but only through repentence and confession."[71] Rather than any act of contrition, however, Nolte seemed to be calling for an exorcism of German history.

Both Nolte and Stürmer reacted to those who criticized the BRD by cloaking such criticism in terms of a critique of the Third Reich. For them, this meant that anyone who tried to defend the BRD against certain kinds of criticism appeared to be defending National Socialism, which was clearly an untenable position. In regard to this methodology, Nolte singled out pacificists and feminists.[72] Nolte went on to state that the "guilt of the Germans" was approaching the mythical "guilt of the Jews."[73]

Andreas Hillgruber was born in 1925 and was a Professor of History at the University of Cologne until he died on 8 May 1989 in hospital in Cologne. In comparison with Nolte, Evans thought that Hillgruber as a historian was "considerably more widely respected and more professional."[74] Konrad Repgen has characterized Hillgruber as having been "for decades one of our most knowledgeable experts for the history of the Second World War, known as a believing Lutheran and conservative democrat."[75] Furthermore, while Maier said that Hillgruber was conservative, "he cannot be suspected of harboring apologetic intentions towards Nazism or any problematic concerns about the Jews."[76]

In 1986, Hillgruber's publisher combined two unrelated lectures of his and published them under the title, *Two Kinds of Downfall: The Destruction of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry*.[77] *Two*

Kinds of Downfall is a short book and is divided into two parts; the first part, consisting of 74 pages, deals with the German position on the Eastern Front during 1944-45, and the second part, consisting of 22 pages, deals with the "extermination" of European Jewry (*Judenvernichtung*). Hillgruber's argumentation in the book has been criticized as having "unfortunate formulations,"[78] having "neutral phrasing . . . [in] . . . the second part of the book"[79] which deals with the extermination of the Jews, and having a title and cover blurb that is seemingly at variance with its contents.[80] As Craig has pointed out, however, whenever Hillgruber speaks about the Jews in the text of the book he always speaks about their "murder" and "destruction" and never about their "end."[81]

In examining the position of the Germans on the Eastern Front in 1944-45, Hillgruber said that the position of the historian was that one should "identify" with the situation of the Germans--both the people and the military--who were fighting against the advancing Red army,[82] because one could certainly not "identify" with Hitler.[83] Since Nationalist Socialist propaganda always had held that the choice was between Hitler and Stalin, the position of the German military in the East was a "hopeless situation."[84] The demand for "Unconditional Surrender" by the Allies did not help the Germans.[85]

For Hillgruber, the "Final Solution" partially belonged to the mass expulsions and exterminations which were characteristic of the twentieth century, such as the Turkish treatment of the Armenians, the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor, and the expulsions resulting from the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939.[86] Hillgruber, however, also

2 of/de 2

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT



PRECISION[SM] RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974

MicroD

15000 COUNTY ROAD 5, BURNSVILLE, MN 55337, USA
TEL: 612 435 7867 FAX: 612 435 7887 TLX: 5106009466

stated that responsibility for the extermination of the Jews and others was partially a result of Hitler's extremist social-Darwinistic logic.[87]

In the second part, Hillgruber traced the fluctuating rise of anti-Semitism in both Europe and Germany. In the final analysis, while Hitler's anti-Semitism exceeded that of a good many of his followers, Hillgruber showed that the coöperation of a goodly number of Germans was responsible for the extermination of the Jews. Hillgruber concluded that there were "dimensions" of the problem which could better be treated in an "anthropological, social psychological, and individual psychological" manner and this, along with the task of keeping alive the memory of the millions who were sacrificed, "transcends the task of the historian."[88]

Jürgen Habermas, born in 1923, is currently a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. He has said that his first two books were continuations of "the Hegelian and Weberian Marxism of the nineteen-twenties,"[89] but said that his Marxist friends would call him a "radical-liberal."[90]

The introductory portion of Habermas's essay, "A Type of Damage Control," was deleted when the essay was published in *Die Zeit*. The introductory portion framed the argument in the context of individual moral responsibility which was viewed in the light of "the Day of Judgment . . . [when] each of us will step into the presence of God as our judge, alone and without proxy . . . as our Christian upbringing has taught us."[91] For Habermas, then, the contextual boundaries of the debate were essentially moral, and this moral context is characteristic

of Western civilization and values which Habermas esteems. One should not muddle the categories of good and evil and erect monuments which do not distinguish between the "victims and the culprits of the Nazi regime."[92]

It was this blurring of the categories of good and evil that impelled Habermas to attack Stürmer as one who was merely continuing the "neo-conservative conception of the world of his teacher, Joachim Ritter."[93] For Habermas, Stürmer was more concerned with the collective nation rather than with individuals in the nation.

Habermas denounced Hillgruber's historical perspective. Habermas believed that the only reason one would write history from the perspective of 1944-45 rather than from that of 1986 was that otherwise "unavoidable questions on the morality of the war of extermination would come into play."[94] Habermas said that when Hillgruber spoke of the extermination of the Jews, Hillgruber just used "empty cliches, the misleading jargon of school days, the icy cold language of bureaucracy."[95] Both Craig and Evans, however, believed that Habermas put too much weight on the cover of the book and not enough weight on the text wherein Hillgruber does speak about "murder" as opposed to the "end" of Jewry.[96] Even so, Evans maintained that while Habermas may have gotten the details about Hillgruber's book wrong, Habermas was certainly correct in criticizing the book's spirit.[97]

In this moral context, Habermas felt that Nolte's argumentation relativized all of National Socialism and ultimately one was left with a world that was characterized by a "California Weltanschauung," a

kalidescope of values in which one could pick and choose whatever one wanted, so that in the end all things are seemingly the same.[98]

Habermas linked Stürmer and Nolte in trying to create a new national consciousness through their historiography. This creation, for Habermas, became a "manipulation" by which the "Nazi crime" would lose its singularity and would become understandable only as the answer to the Bolshevik menace which is "always standing at the door."[99] Habermas was correct in seeing that for the neo-conservatives in the BRD the bogey man traditionally has been the Bolshevik menace. The fear of the Bolshevik menace was illustrated in a series of twelve posters in *Geschichtswende*. The years in which the posters appeared range from 1919 to 1972, and although the posters were distributed by parties ranging from the National Socialists to the CDU, the similarities are striking.[100]

In a brief letter to the *FAZ*, Habermas responded to Klaus Hildebrand's response to him in that same paper. Habermas briefly recapitulated his points: Stürmer's "search for identity" would turn "historical consciousness into a substitute for religion"; the negative sense of historicization seems to be found in the neo-conservative view of what constitutes a desirable identity; Hillgruber's book reinforces K. E. Jeismann's saying: "The greater the role of Hitler and his ruling system, the greater the 'guiltlessness' [*entschuldbarer*] of the German people.[101]

In general terms, the contours of the debate had been set by the original principals. While the controversy had been building for years,[102] it was only when Habermas criticized Stürmer, Nolte, and

Hillgruber that it became public. Part of the debate degenerated into *ad hominem* attacks; for example, Rudolf Augstein, the publisher of *Der Spiegel*, called Hillgruber a "constitutional Nazi;"[103] by implication, the epithet also included those whom Augstein identified as Hillgruber's supporters, such as Joachim Fest and Ernst Nolte.[104] Imanuel Geiss, Professor of History at the University of Bremen and a historian of the "Fischer School,"[105] in a letter to *Der Spiegel*, defended Nolte's right to ask questions and, by implication, accused Augstein and Habermas of censorship.[106] On a personal level, the debate went quickly downhill. On a factual, or more academic level, there were arguments and counter-arguments as well.

Both Jürgen Kocka and Wehler attacked Nolte's use of analogies in trying to find precursors for the extermination of the Jews. Kocka admitted that comparisons are possible when one uses concepts such as totalitarianism; however, the singularity of National Socialism stands out when one compares what happened in Germany with other Western nations and not with Stalin's Russia or Pol Pot's Cambodia.[107] Wehler rejected Nolte's argument that there was some sort of "causal nexus" between any Soviet policy of exterminating people based on class and National Socialist policies of extermination based on race; Wehler specifically termed such a "nexus" as "nebulous."[108] Kocka wrote that there was a qualitative difference between the bureaucratic and systematic murder instituted by the National Socialists and, by implication, the unsystematic way the Soviets went about their mass murder.[109] In a point-by-point manner, Wehler refuted Nolte's use of sources in positing that National Socialist terror had precursors in

Asiatic influences in the Russian Cheka.[110] For Wehler, even though it is understandable to place 1933 in the context of European history, of first importance was the fact that "Hitler and National Socialism must be understood as a product of imperial German history and German-Austrian history."[111]

One of the more interesting exchanges which arose on account of the *Historikerstreit* was the exhange between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer "Concerning the 'Historicization' of National Socialism."[112] The late Martin Broszat, who was born in 1926 and died in October 1989, was the Director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, an Honorary Professor of History at the University of Munich, and was editor of the "universally recognized" six volume *Bayern in der NS-Zeit*;[113] Broszat was a structuralist. Saul Friedländer, who was born in 1932, is a Professor of History at the University of Tel Aviv and the University of California, Los Angeles. The exchange of letters, however, exhibited some of the mistrust and recriminations that have characterized the *Historikerstreit*. The exhange of letters was initiated by Friedländer, who was responding to a 1985 article in *Merkur* by Broszat.[114]

For Broszat, *Historisierung* was part of *Alltagsgeschichte*, or, the history of every day life. Working within a structuralist framework, *Alltagsgeschichte* seeks to re-create daily life in National Socialist Germany. Broszat made two points: 1) "the Nazi period cannot be excluded from historical understanding," regardless of its crimes; and, 2) "my concept of historicization is founded on a principle of critical, enlightened historical understanding (*Verstehen*)," which was to be

distinguished from the romantic and idealized *Verstehen* of the nineteenth century.[115] *Alltagsgeschichte* would address the entirety of life in the National Socialist regime, from the colossally horrendous to the trivial and banal. Furthermore, for Broszat, this would also speak to the continuities and discontinuities in German life and German history. It would also mean that while Auschwitz was important, the historian cannot write history teleologically[116] and therefore Auschwitz cannot "be made after the fact, into the cardinal point, the hinge on which the entire factual complex of historical events of the Nazi period turns."[117]

Needless to say, Friedländer had quite a bit of trouble with Broszat's concept of *Historisierung*. For Friedländer, even though the concept was methodologically sound, it could lead to an undesirable apology or complete relativization or trivialization of the National Socialist era. For Friedländer, this period of time cannot be treated as one might treat sixteenth-century France.[118] For him, if Auschwitz is not the "historical 'boundary event,'" then what will happen to the perspective of the victims?[119] Charles Maier put the problem into focus when he wrote that, for Broszat, *Historisierung* was an attempt to understand the regime that produced an Auschwitz while for Friedländer any attempt to understand the regime apart from Auschwitz was, by its very nature, an attempt to "exculpate."[120]

Even though Broszat's article was published before the onset of the *Historikerstreit*, Dan Diener believed that the question of *Historisierung* was part and parcel of the *Historikerstreit*.[121] While Diener's book contains different points of view, for Diener the problem

of *Historisierung* was reducible to whether there was any such thing as an *Historisierung* of National Socialism apart from that which was formulated by Ernst Nolte.[122] Not all of the contibutors agreed with Diener's reduction of the problem to an either/or situation. However, Diener was correct in seeing the *Historikerstreit* as a "debate concerning moral meaning, the historical position and historiographical comparability of National Socialism."[123] While still having sensitivity for the position of Friedländer and others, Ian Kernshaw has stated that *Alltagsgeschichte*'s location of

> social history . . . in description and structured analysis of 'everyday' experience . . . breaks down the unreflected distance which has traditionally been provided by abstractions such as 'totalitarian rule' and compels a deeper comprehension through greater awareness of the complexity of social reality."[124]

Neither Wehler nor Kocka thought much of *Alltagsgeschichte*, although neither tied their criticisms to a specific historian involved in the *Historikerstreit*. Kocka thought that this history, which he also termed "microhistory," was a deficient history in that it sacrificed any knowledge of coherence, ignored the "great questions" of class and state conceptualization, religion, and so forth.[125] Wehler thought that it operated under *neohistorischen* illusions and was a "history without concepts."[126] Wehler specifically critized *Alltag* historians for remaining aloof from the *Historikerstreit* because for them it was part and parcel of the "uninteresting 'history from above.'"[127]

The controversy, which has not to date reached any conclusion, worked its way through the three dimensions of interpretation. On the historical-philosophical plane, the two sides divided roughly between the structuralists and intentionalists. However, having said that, each

side has borrowed from the other; for example, Hillgruber readily admitted the benefits of social history in interpreting continuities and discontinuities in German history,[128] but still maintained that intentionalism as an historical explanandum is *primus inter pares* with structuralism. After the Fischer controversy, social history and the methodology of the social sciences is a permanent addition in German historiography, but the political conclusions which specific historians make of that history is still the source of controversy.

On the political-ideological plane, the "neo-conservatives" have had their position reflected at the federal level while the CDU/CSU maintains power. With the unification of the Germanies, it is difficult to predict what direction historical studies will take. In regard to the questions raised in the *Historikerstreit*, it is also difficult to see when and in what form they will re-emerge in either public or scholary venues of debate. It may be that the economic problems resulting from unification will take precedence over discussions of continuity and *Geschichtsbewußtsein*. As Eley has pointed out, politically even Habermas and Stürmer are not that far apart in their rejection of a German *Sonderweg* and an acceptance of Western values.[129]

The moral side is somewhat more problematical. None of the academics involved is a revisionist in the sense of a David Irving, who denies that Hitler knew of the Holocaust. However, neither does any one want to write teleological history. Thus, Broszat finds himself in the unlikely company of Nolte; Nolte wants to "de-demonize" the Third Reich and Broszat wants to pursue a *Historisierung*. *Alltagsgeschichte* does

promise understanding in the manner of the *Annales* in France, but it also holds the danger for a trivialization and, in effect, an amoralization of the Third Reich. In an interview with Hillgruber, Chancellor Kohl said that for him German history included Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen as well as the White Rose and the men and women of 20 July 1944.[130] Morally, one might say that Kohl was seeking to find some redemptive balance between the darkness of the National Socialists and some small sliver of light reflecting from the resistance. As Thomas Nipperdey has remarked, when one considers the problem of continuities in German history there is always the danger of sounding "apologetic."[131] The moral problem weaves its way through the other dimensions as well.

In the *Historikerstreit*, there was no one contribution which dealt exclusively with continuity--or discontinuity--in German history. Continuity was like an undercurrent just below the surface of the argument, and every once in a while it surged upwards. For example, even though he did not use the word "continuity," continuity was implicit in Michael Stürmer's statement that "in a land without history everything is possible."[132] If one were looking into the continuities or discontinuities of German history, then one could find sources of legitimacy for virtually any political position in the BRD, and that was the problem. The problem was not that there was not any history in the German past to which those living in the present could relate; instead, the problem was which kind of history was to be emphasized. As Wehler has remarked concerning the use of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, its

emancipatory task is to restore to history its role as *Historia Magistra Vitae*.[133]

While this demonstrates the interrelationship between continuity and *Geschichtsbewußtsein*, the contentious issue is the kind of magisterial role history is to play. For example, some have emphasized the growing importance of the parliamentary process and the economic modernization which occurred during the Kaiserreich; on the other hand, others have emphasized that the parliamentary process was essentially closed and that economic modernization not only had tremendous social costs but that it also helped to entrench the conservative elites who tried to stem the political implications of modernization. A feeble parliamentary system and the constellation of entrenched, perpetuating conservative elites added to the instability of the Weimar Republic, which passed away in 1933 with the accession of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor. These two views of continuities and discontinuties from 1871 to 1933 are not necessarily mutually exclusive; but to be complimentary, a balance must be achieved--not only in presentation but also in the methodological orientation to the problems. In the *Historikerstreit*, such a balance was not achieved on this and other topics since the discussion was fuelled by political partisanship. Such a balance will only come with time and will be resolved by Germans writing about Germany within the the newly reunified country.

NOTES

1. See: *"Historikerstreit": Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialischen Judenvernichtung: Texte von Rudolf Augstein, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Martin Broszat, Micha Brumlik, Walter Euchner, Joachim Fest, Helmut Fleischer, Imanuel Geiss, Jürgen Habermas, Hanno Helbing, Klaus Hildebrand, Jürgen Kocka, Robert Leicht, Eberhard Jäckel, Christian Meier, Horst Möller, Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang Mommsen, Thomas Nipperdey, Ernst Nolte, Joachim Perels, Hagen Schulze, Kurt Sontheimer, Michael Stürmer, Heinrich August Winkler.* Munich: Piper, 1987; out of the 42 re-printed items in this collection, only three items appeared in academic journals rather than the popular press. Also: Reinhard Kühnl, ed., *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht: Die 'Historiker-Debatte': Dokumentation, Darstellung und Kritik.* Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987. Kühnl's anthology contains two exceptions to the inclusion of material from the popular media, since two commentaries are included, one of which first appeared in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* and the other in *Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts*. Kühnl, however, severely edited some of the articles; while on the other hand, the collection published by Piper reprinted articles in their entirety without abridgement.

2. Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), 5-17; in addition to the three dimensions, the personal dimension was included in the following analysis: Eckhard Jesse, "Der sogenannte "Historikerstreit": Ein *deutscher* Streit," in *Die Last der Geschichte: Kontroversen zur deutschen Identität*, ed. by Thomas M. Gauly (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1988), 9-54.

3. Peter Stadler, "Rückblick auf einen Historikerstreit--Versuch einer Beurteilung aus nichtdeutscher Sicht," *Historische Zeitschrift* 247 (1988): 15: "Historikerdispute haben in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft ihre Tradition und reflektieren fast immer auch das Ringen um eine politische Standortbestimmung."

4. Gernot Erler, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Ulrich Rose, Thomas Schnabel, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Wolfram Wette, *Geschichtswende? Entsorgungsversuche zur deutsche Vergangenheit*, with a foreword by Walter Dirks (Freiburg: Dreisam, 1987), 148-166.

5. Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and the German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 1-8.

6. Andreas Dorpalen, *German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985), 499.

7. W. Schmidt, "Nationalgeschichte der DDR und das territorialstaatliche historische Erbe," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 29 (1981): 400.

8. Gerhard Lozek, "Der Streit geht weiter: Zum Versuch einer apologetischen Revision des Faschismusbildes durch rechtkonservative Historiker der BRD," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 36 (1988): 9.

9. Ibid., 10. For those interested in irony, it is appropriate to note that Lozek's argument on collective guilt is not that far removed from those on both the extreme left and extreme right in West Germany who maintained--albeit for very different reasons--that collective guilt is no longer appropriate in West Germnay. Some maintained that it never was appropriate.

10. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age": Contemporary German Perspectives*, ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. Andrew Buchwalter (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 252, footnote 3.

11. See: Georg Iggers, "New Directions in Historical Studies in the German Democratic Republic," *History and Theory* 28, no. 1 (1989): 59-77.

12. Ibid., 67-69.

13. Geoff Eley, "Viewpoint: Nazism, Politics and Public Memory: Thoughts on the West German *Historikerstreit* 1986-1987, *Past and Present* 121 (November 1988): 183:

> *Berufsverbot* was the generic name for decrees and practices which, beginning in 1972, badly compromised civil liberties in the F.R.G. [Federal Republic of Germany] for anyone with a record of 'extremist' political involvement holding or applying for a civil service job (that is, university and school teachers, railway and post workers, doctors and nurses in state hospitals, as well as civil servants in the narrower sense, amounting to some 16 per cent of total employment). This was a powerful device for tightening the public ideological climate against Marxist and other radical ideas.

14. Eley, 178; Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 170-171.

15. Ibid., 173.

16. Ibid., 192.

17. Ibid., 171.

18. Anthony Giddens, "Jürgen Habermas," chap. in *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, edited by Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 136-137.

19. For a reasonably balanced overview of the controversy surrounding the incident at Bitburg, see the following anthology: Geoffrey Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Hartman's anthology, however, does not always cite the source for the various essays, commentaries, and speeches contained in the anthology. Another anthology on the Bitburg incident is: Ilya Levkov, ed., *Bitburg and Beyond: Encounters in American, German and Jewish History (New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1987)*.

20. Maier, 13.

21. Rolf Kosiek, *Historikerstreit und Geschichtsrevision* (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 1987), 85.

22. Walter Laqueur, *Germany Today: A Personal Report* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), 158.

23. Ibid., 162.

24. Kosiek, 61-62.

25. Michael Stürmer, "Berlin und Bonn: Suche nach der deutschen Geschichte," in *Dissonanzen des Fortschritts: Essays über Geschichte und Politik in Deutschland*, by Michael Stürmer (Munich: Piper, 1986), 289-304.

26. Kosiek, 63: "Den Planern wurde unter anderem zu starke Betonung der CDU-Regierungspolitik . . . ."

27. Ibid., 63-64.

28. Ibid., 62-64; the idea of a museum in Bonn was supported by such historians as Lothar Gall, Klaus Hildebrand, Ulrich Löber, and Horst Müller while the one in Berlin was supported by Richard von Weizsäker, who was then the mayor of Berlin and later became President of the BRD.

29. Ibid., 67.

30. Thomas Nippperdey, "Kann Geschichte objectiv sein?" in *Nachdenken über die deutsche Geschichte*, by Thomas Nipperdey (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986), 218-234.

31. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum 'Historikerstreit'* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 117-120.

32. V.R. Berghahn, *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 253-254.

33. This analysis is in substantial agreement with that of Wolfgang Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen noch Vergessen befreit von der Vergangenheit: Die Harmonisierung des Geschichtsbildes gefährdet die Freiheit," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 305-312.

34. Kershaw, 62-65.

35. Ibid., 65-69.

36. Ibid., 65.

37. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 302:

> In der historische Forschung gewannen diese "revisionistischen" Bestrebungen seit den späten 50er Jahren schrittweise an Boden und vermochten in der 60er und 70er Jahren sogar eine Hegemonialstellung innerhalb der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft zu eroben.

38. Thomas Nipperdey, "1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte," in *Nachdenken*, 501.

39. Ibid., 492-494.

40. Wehler noted that in Gerhard Ritter's 1936 biography of Frederick the Great, Ritter "on his own made the connection between Friedrich II and the Potsdam Spectacle with Hindenburg and Hitler" ("Historiography," 226). In a footnote to this passage, Wehler went on to note that while the passage appeared in the 1936 edition, it was not included in editions after 1945 ("Historiography," 253, footnote 11). What Ritter wrote in 1936 is as follows (Gerhard Ritter, *Friedrich der Große: Ein historisches Profil* [Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1936], 2):

> In der Potsdamer Garisonkirche beschwor Hindenburg den Geist des alten Preußen herauf, 'das in Gottesfurcht und pflichttreuer Arbeit, nie verzagendem Mut und hingebender Vaterlandsliebe groß geworden ist'! Der Kanzler Adolf Hitler aber erklärte im Namen der Reichsregierung: 'Wir wollen die großen Traditionen unseres Volkes, seine Geschichte und Kultur in demütiger Ehrfurcht pflegen.' Durch Niederlagen eines Kranzes am Grabe Friedrichs des Großen wurden diese Traditionen sogleich näher bezeichnet.

Ritter, however, went on to write that "a symbolic action of this type contains an obligation" which "will require a very serious historic-political reflection on their concrete contents" (2). Thus, one can say

that in an oblique way Ritter wanted to determine whether this "symbolic action" was an acurate reflection of the past or whether it was an attempt to project current political aspirations onto and into a past which would have found this symbolism to be quite alien to it.

41. Andreas Hillgruber, *Germany and the Two World Wars*, trans. by William C. Kirby (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), vii.

42. Wolfang Mommsen, "Weder Leugnen" in *"Historikerstreit"*, 303:

> Seit einigen Jahren ist diese hegemoniale Position der Revisionisten im öffentlichen Bewußtsein, wenn schon nicht innerhalb des akademischen Systems selbst, zunehmend unter Beschluß geraten. Eine Tendenzwende deutet sich an. Dies was zu Teilen innerwissenschaftlich begründet, hatten doch die Revisionisten in dem Bemühen, die antidemokratischen Elemente der deutschen Tradition rein herauspräparieren, ihre Kritik bisweilen zu weit getrieben . . . . Thomas Nipperdey machte sich zum Sprecher dieser neuen Tendenzen, wenn er, insbesondere gegen Hans-Ulrich Wehler gewandt, forderte, daß die Geschichtswissenschaft der Bundesrepublik davon abgehen müsse, einseitig die Kontinuitäten der deutschen Geschichte zu betonen, die zum Jahre 1933 hinführen; sie sollte sich stattdessen anderen Kontinuitäten, die die gegenwärtige Wirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik zum Gegenstand haben, gleichermaßen, wenn gar nicht vorzugweise zuwenden.

43. Laqueur, 159.

44. Ibid.

45. Eley, 191.

46. Ibid.

47. Andreas Hillgruber, *Endlich genug über Nationalsozialismus und Zweiten Weltkrieg? Forschungsstand und Literatur* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1982).

48. Richard J. Evans, "The New Nationalism and the Old History: Perspectives on the West German *Historikerstreit*," *Journal of Modern History* 59 (December 1987): 782.

49. Jürgen Habermas, "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung," *Die Zeit* (11 July 1986) in *"Historikerstreit"*, 62-76.

50. Ibid, 63: ". . . erschienene Untersuchung offensichtlich an Laien adressiert ist."

51. Michael Stürmer, "Geschichte in geschichtslosem Land," *FAZ* (25 April 1986) in *"Historikerstreit"*, 36-38.

52. Ibid., 36 and 38: "In einem Land ohne Erinnerung ist alles möglich."

53. Ibid., 37-38.

54. Gordon Craig, "The War of the German Historians," *New York Review of Books* 33 (15 January 1987): 17.

55. Stürmer, "Geschichte," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 38.

56. Maier, 28.

57. Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 20.

58. Craig, 16.

59. Eley, 172. Georg Iggers, for example, made no reference to Nolte in his books on German or European historiography: Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, revised ed. (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); *New Directions in European Historiography*, revised ed. (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1984).

60. "Fernsehgespräch zwischen Hans Mommsen und Ernst Nolte vom 7. Februar 1987" in *Das Vergehen der Vergangenheit: Antwort an meine Kritiker im sogenannten Historikerstreit*, by Ernst Nolte (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1987), 84.

61. Ernst Nolte, "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte," *FAZ* (6 June 1986), in *"Historikerstreit"*, 39-47.

62. Evans, 764, quoting the organizers of the colloquium in their publication of the proceedings, *Gegen den Versuch, Vergangenheit zu verbiegen*, ed. by Hilmar Hoffmann (1987).

63. Nolte, "Vergangenheit," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 43.

64. Ibid., 46.

65. Ibid., 42.

66. Ernst Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s," in *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. by H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1985), 17-38; the German text, "Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus? Das Dritte Reich im Blickwinkel des Jahres 1980," appears in *"Historikerstreit"*, 13-35, and the editor noted (35) that this was a reworking of Nolte's presentation in 1980 at

the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, which in turn was reprinted in an abridged version in the FAZ of 11 July 1980.

67. Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism," 18-19.

68. In this context, the use of *Instrumentalisierung* may refer to the DDR's manipulation of history in order to create a uniform *Geschichtsbild*: Horst Möller, "Geschichtsbilder oder Geschichtsbild? Ein Vergleich zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR," in *Symposium: Wem gehört die deutsche Geschichte? Deutschlands Weg von alten Europa in die europäischen Moderne*, ed. Klaus Hildebrand (Cologne: J. P. Bachen [Hans Martin Schleyer-Stiftung], 1987), 36-37.

69. Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism," 36-37.

70. Hanno Helbing, "Suchbild der Vergangenheit: Was vom deutschen Geschichtsbuch erwartet wird," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 151-155.

71. Theodore Hamerow, "Review Essay: Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History," *American Historical Review* 18 (February 1983): 60.

72. Nolte, "Vergangenheit," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 39-41.

73. Ibid., 43.

74. Evans, 768.

75. Konrad Repgen, "Der Historikerstreit": Einige Anmerkungen zu den aktuellen Veröffentlichungen über kontroverse Grundprobleme unserer Geschichte," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 107 (1987): 417.

76. Maier, 19.

77. Andreas Hillgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums* (Berlin: Corso bei Siedler, 1986).

78. Beatrice Heuser, "The *Historikerstreit*: Uniqueness and Comparability of the Holocaust," *German History* 6 (April 1988): 75.

79. Evans, 774.

80. Craig, 16.

81. Ibid.

82. Hillgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang*, 24-25:

> Schaut der Historiker auf die Winter-Katastrophe 1944/45, so bleibt nur eine Position, auch wenn sie im Einzelfall oft schwer einzulösen ist: er muß sich mit dem konkreten Schicksal der

deutschen Bevölkerung im Osten und mit den verzweifelten und opferreichen Anstrengungen des deutschen Ostheeres und der deutschen Marine in Ostseebereich identifizieren, die die Bevölkerung des deutschen Ostens vor den Racheorgien der Roten Armee, den Massenvergewaltigungen, den willkürlich Morden und den wahllosen Deportationen zu bewahren und in der allerletzten Phase den Ostdeutschen den Fluchtweg zu Lande oder über See nach Westen freizuhalten suchten.

83. Ibid., 23.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., 65.

86. Ibid., 66-67.

87. Ibid., 90 and 92.

88. Ibid, 98-99:

Das sind Dimensionen, die ins Anthropologische, ins Sozialpsychologische und ins Individualpsychologische gehen und die Frage einer möglichen Wiederholung unter anderen ideologischen Vorzeichen in tätsachlich oder vermeintlich wiederum extremen Situationen und Konstellationen aufwerfen. Das geht über jenes Wachhalten der Erinnerung an Millionen der Opfer hinaus, das dem Historiker aufgeben ist. Denn hier wird ein zentrales Problem der Gegenwart und der Zukunft berührt und die Aufgabe des Historikers tranzendiert.

89. Jürgen Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas*, ed. by Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986), 150.

90. Ibid., 174.

91. Jürgen Habermas, "A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic Tendencies)," trans. by Jeremy Leaman, *New German Critique* 44 (Spring/Summer 1988): 25.

92. Ibid., 26.

93. Habermas, "Eine Art," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 62.

94. Ibid., 64: ". . . denn dann kämen unvermeidlich Fragen der 'Moral in Vernichtungskriegen'ins Spiel."

95. Ibid., 66: ". . . unausgedünsteten Klischees eines aus Jugendtagen mitgeführten Jargons, hier die bürokratisch geforene Sprache."

96. Craig, 16; Evans, 724. The copy of *Zweierlei Untergang* in the University of Alberta library has been rebound for library use and does not have the original cover; thus, the above mentioned descriptions of the cover are based on secondary source descriptions.

97. Craig, 16.

98. Habermas, "Eine Art," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 70.

99. Ibid., 71.

100. Erler et. al., 92-94.

101. Jürgen Habermas, "Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 183 (11 August 1986), 7. Habermas's letter appeared as one of several dealing with the subject on page 7, which was devoted to "Briefe an die Herausgeber." Hildebrand's article ("Das Zeitalter der Tyrannen: Geschichte und Politik: Die Verwalter der Aufklärung, des Risiko der Wissenschaft und die Geborgenheit der Weltanschauung/Eine Entgegung auf Jürgen Habermas") appeared in the *FAZ* of 31 July 1986 and took up the bottom half of page 17. In the *FAZ* of this period, articles appeared concerning not only the up-coming federal elections, but also the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Berlin wall, questions concerning German identity (see: Karl-Dietrich Bracher, "Das Modewort Identität und die deutsche Frage: Exkurs über jüngere und jüngste Kontroversen" *FAZ* 182 [9 August 1986]), a controvery in Baden-Württenberg concerning the national anthem (see: Mathias Schreiber, "Der wanderne Berg: Aus Anlaß des Streits um die Nationalhymne," *FAZ* 167 [23 July 1986], 19), and so forth. From reading the papers of this period, one obtains a sense that events intensified the *Historikerstreit*.

102. Konrad Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians," *German Studies Review* 11 (May 1988): 286.

103. Rudolf Augstein, "Die Neue Auschwitz-Lüge," in *Der Spiegel* (6 October 1986), in *"Historikerstreit"*, 198: "Wer so denkt und spricht, ist ein konstitutioneller Nazi . . . ."

104. Ibid., 197.

105. Maier, 51.

106. Imanuel Geiss, "Leserbrief an 'Der Spiegel', 20. Oktober 1986," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 221.

107. Jürgen Kocka, "Hitler sollte nicht durch Stalin and Pol Pot verdrängt werden: Über Versuche deutscher Historiker, die Ungeheuerlichkeit von NS-Verbrechen zu relativieren." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 134-135.

108. Wehler, *Entsorgung*, 105.

109. Kocka, 134.

110. Wehler, *Entsorgung*, 147-154.

111. Ibid., 202:

> Noltes These von den fatalen Wirkungen des angsterzeugenden Vorbilds der bolschewistischen Klassenkriegsführung richtete sich vor allem gegen die vielfach gesicherte Interpretation, daß Hitler und der Nationalsozialismus in erster Linie als ein Produkt der Reichsdeutschen und der deutsch-österreichischen Geschichte verstanden werden müssen.

112. Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "Um die 'Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus': Ein Briefwechsel," *Viertelsjahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36 (April 1988): 339-372; this article has been translated by *Yad Vashem Studies* 19 (Fall 1988) as: Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism," *New German Critique* 44 (Spring/Summer 1988): 85-126.

113. Kershaw, 151: "The 'Bavaria Project' was a landmark because it examined, for the first time in any systematic fashion, popular opinion, mentalities and behaviour, and because it tried--again a breakthrough--to write the history of society in the Third Reich 'from below.'"

114. Martin Broszat, "Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus," in *Nach Hitler. Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte. Beiträge von Martin Broszat*, edited by Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke, 159-173 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1987).

115. Broszat, "A Controversy," in *New German Critique*, 87.

116. This terminology is not Broszat's; see: Nipperdey, "1933" in *Nachdenken*.

117. Broszat, "A Controversy," in *New German Critique*, 103.

118. Friedländer, "A Controversy," in *New German Critique, 93*.

119. Ibid., 125.

120. Maier, 92.

121. Dan Diener, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit*, ed. Dan Diener (Frankfurt a/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), 9; Diener rhetorically asked: "Besteht wirklich ein bislang unerkannter, untergründiger Zusammenhang zwischen 'Historikerstreit' und Historisierung?"

122. Ibid., 9:

> Führt das Projekt der Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus notwendig zu solchen Positionen, für die der Name Ernst Nolte heute steht? Oder sind Historisierungen des Nationalsozialismus denkbar, die im Bewußtsein des besonderen Charakters des Nationalsozialismus eine Vergeschichtlichung zu betreiben vermögen, ohne *notwendig* in den Sog der Nolteschen Vorgaben zu geraten?

123. Ibid., 7: "Der 'Historikerstreit'--eine Auseinandersetzung über moralische Bedeutung, geschichtlichen Ort und historiographische Vergleichbarkeit des Nationalsozialismus . . ."

124. Kernshaw, 164.

125. Kocka, 136-137.

126. Wehler, "Alltagsgeschichte: Königsweg zu neuen Ufern oder Irrgarten der Illusionen?", in *Aus der Geschichte lernen? Essays*, by Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 142-143.

127. Ibid., 149. For a more positive view in English of *Alltagsgeschichte*, see: Geoff Eley, "Labor History, Social History, *Alltagsgeschichte*: Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday--a New Direction for German Social History," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (1989): 297-343. According to Eley, part of the growth in *Alltagsgeschichte* is attributable to the oversupply of history graduates in 1960s and 1970s as well as to the "'greening' of social history" with the rise of the peace movement and the Green party (298). Since *Alltagsgeschichte* has directly challenged the relationship between the SPD and the labour movement,

> it is no surprise that the fiercest response to the new thinking among historians has come from those who have most heavily invested in the liberal-democratic evolution of the SPD since 1945--an evolution that at another level is precisely the alienation of the labor movement's formalized institutional discourse from those mundane perceptions and experiences of ordinary workers in the production and reproduction of their everyday lives . . . (343).

One inference which may be drawn from Eley's observations is that theoretical objections to *Alltagsgeschichte* may mask political objections, much in the same way that opposing historians in the *Historikerstreit* have accused each other of using certain methodological approaches to mask their political agendas. Furthermore, Kershaw cited the work of the late Detlev Peukert to show "that a concern with everyday behaviour and mentalities by no means implies empathetic treatment" (Kershaw, 162). See also: Detlev J.K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*, trans. by Richard Deveson (London: Penguin, 1989). Peukert explicitly stated

that his purpose was to go beyond explanatory models such as fascism and totalitarianism because both of these theories only "dealt with the political system of authority, the wielders of power and the mechanisms of suppression, and they largely ignored the experience of those affected by the system, namely the mass of the population" (Peukert, 23).

128. Hillgruber, *Germany and the Two World Wars*, vii.

129. Eley, "Viewpoint," 183.

130. Helmut Kohl, "Selbstbestimmung--wie jedes Volk der Erde," an interview conducted by Andreas Hillgruber from *Die Welt* (1 October 1986) in Kühnl, *Vergangenheit*, 107.

131. Nipperdey, "1933," in *Nachdenken*, 186.

132. Stürmer, "Geschichte," in *"Historikerstreit"*, 36.

133. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 12.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to see historical continuity as a purely theoretical or metaphysical concept. While it is true that continuity has always been a concept which has undergirded the writing of history, its formulation has always been contingent upon the consciously or unconsciously formulated assumptions of those who have been the writers of history. If one looks at the rules against which one might judge the validity of the construction of any particular formulation of historical continuity, one must say that they operate best on the basis of exception. This is to say, it is easier to note when a particular rule has been violated than to formulate an iron-clad set of regulations on how to use them in a proper manner. In part, this rule by exception is due to the fact that the construction of a particular historical continuity is dependent on the approach of the historian to the subject matter at hand. Furthermore, this approach is in turn dependent upon the tradition in which the historian is working. Thus, the construction of historical continuity is dependent upon the validity of the construction itself, the assumptions (or paradigm) which the historian is using, and the tradition in which the historian stands.

In the writing of German history, all three of these criteria have come into play. Depending on the chronology one uses, the paradigm shift in the writing of German history in West Germany came about in the late 1960s or early 1970s. One saw a conscious shift in some sectors from following the tradition of *Historismus* to a gradual inclusion of

Gesellschaftsgeschichte in the writing of history. Along with this shift, one also can note the struggle for the practioners of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* not only to secure legitimacy within the historical profession for their approach but also to secure representation and continuity for their students within the historical profession itself. This struggle for acceptance and continuity within the profession has also been marked by resistance to *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* on the part of those who do not share the political orientation of those who are changing the paradigm.

The questions which were addressed by the *Historikerstreit* in "coming to terms with the past," have had to do with the construction of a historical continuity which addressed both the problems of securing the validity of such a historical continuity through historical scholarship as well as securing the basis of the political legitimacy of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to this, as mentioned above, the historians were quarrelling amongst themselves about continuity within the professional guild itself. The resolution of the question of historical continuity will not be dependent upon questions of historical scholarship alone. Rather, the resolution will come as the historians themselves not only settle their internal disputes but reflect the new Germany that came into existence as a result of re-unification (the process is ongoing). One should not expect an early or easy resolution of the problem of historical continuity within Germany; after all, such subjects as the French Revolution and the English Revolution still remain subjects for contention today, even though

hundreds of years have now passed since the actual "events" have taken place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aubin, Hermann. "Zur Frage der historischen Kontinuität im Allgemeinen." *In Kulturbruch oder Kulturkontinuität im Übergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. Paul Egon Hübinger, 164-202. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

Augstein, Rudolf. "Die Neue Auschwitz-Lüge." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 196-203.

Barzun, Jacques and Henry F. Graf. *The Modern Researcher*. 4th edition. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985.

Bausinger, Hermann. "Zur Algebra der Kontinuität." In *Kontinuität? Geschichtlichkeit und Dauer als volkskundliches Problem*, ed. Hermann Bausinger and Wolfgang Brückner, 9-30. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1969.

Berghahn, V.R. *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*. 2d edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

_____. *Militarism: The History of an International Debate 1861-1979*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Bochner, Salomon. "Continuity and Discontinuity in Nature and Knowledge." In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*. Vol. 1. Ed. Philip P. Wiener, 492-504. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

Bracher, Karl-Dietrich. "Das Modewort Identität und die deutsche Frage: Exkurs über jüngere und jüngste Kontroversen." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 182 (9 August 1986) [no page number in Saturday supplement].

Breisach, Ernest. *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Broszat, Martin. "Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus." In *Nach Hitler. Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte. Beiträge von Martin Broszat*, ed. Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke, 159-173. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1987.

Broszat, Martin and Saul Friedländer. "A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism." *New German Critique* 44 (Spring/Summer 1988): 85-126.

Brunner, Emil. "§ F. Religionsphilosophie: Evangelische Theologie." In *Handbuch der Philosophie*. Vol. 2. *Natur/Geist/Gott*, ed. A. Baeumler and M. Schröder. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1927.

Carr, William. "The Hitler Image in the Last Half-Century." In *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. by J.W. Koch, 462-488. London: Macmillian, 1985.

Childs, Brevard. *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979.

Craig, Gordon A. "Editor's Introduction." In *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy*, by Eckart Kehr, translated by Grete Heina, ed. with an Introduction by Gordon A. Craig, vii-xxi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

_____. "The War of the German Historians." *New York Review of Books* 33 (15 January 1987): 16-19.

Diener, Dan. "Einleitung des Herausgebers." In *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Hisorisierung und Historikerstreit*, ed. by Dan Diener, 7-16. Frankfurt a/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. *Society and Democracy in Germany*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967.

Dopsch, Alfons. "Von Altertum zum Mittelalter. Das Kontinuitätsproblem." In *Kulturbruch oder Kulturkontinuität im Übergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. by Paul Egon Hübinger, 78-103. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

Dorpalen, Andreas. *German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985.

Eley, Geoff. "Viewpoint: Nazism, Politics and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German *Historikerstreit* 1986-1987." *Past and Present: A Journal of Historical Studies* 121 (November 1988): 171-208.

_____. "Labor History, Social History, *Alltagsgeschichte*: Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday--a New Direction for German Social History." *Journal of Modern History* 61 (1989): 297-343.

_____. *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986.

Erler, Gernot, and Rolf-Dieter Müller, Ulrich Rose, Thomas Schnabel, Gerd R. Ueberschär, and Wolfram Wette. *Geschichtswende? Entsorgungsversuche zur deutsche Vergangenheit*. Forward by Walter Dirks. Freiburg: Dreisam, 1987.

Evans, Richard J. "The New Nationalism and the Old History: Perspectives on the West German *Historikerstreit*." *Journal of Modern History* 59 (December 1987): 761-797.

_____. *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1987.

Faulenbach, Brend. *Ideologie des deutschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1980.

Fischer, David Hackett. *Historians' Fallacies: Towards a Logic of Historical Thought*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970.

Gall, Lothar. "Einleitung," In *Das Bismarck-Problem in der Geschichtsschreibung nach 1945*, ed. Lothar Gall, 9-24. Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, no. 42. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971.

_____. *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary*. Vol. 2. *1871-1898*. Translated by J. A. Underwood. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

_____. "Bismarck und der Bonapartismus." *Historische Zeitschrift* 223 (1976): 618-637.

Gardiner, Patrick, ed. *Theories of History*. The Free Press Textbooks in Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959.

_____, ed. *The Philosophy of History*. Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Geiss, Imanuel. "Leserbrief an 'Der Spiegel': 20 Oktober 1986." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 220-222.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. "Some Methodological Problems in Economic History." In *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, by Alexander Gerschenkron, 40-49. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

_____. "On the Concept of Continuity in History." In *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, 11-39. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Giddens, Anthony. "Jürgen Habermas." In *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, ed. Quentin Skinner, 121-139. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Habermas, Jürgen. *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interview with Jürgen Habermas*. Ed. Peter Dews. London: Verso, 1986.

_____. "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung." *Die Zeit* (11 July 1986). In *"Historikerstreit"*, 62-75.

_____. "A Kind of Settlement Damages (Apologetic Tendencies)." Trans. Jeremy Leaman. *New German Critique* 44 (Spring/Summer 1988): 25-39.

_____. "Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 183 (11 August 1986), 7.

Hamerow, Theodore. "Review Essay: Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History." *American Historical Review* 88 (February 1983): 53-72.

Hartman, Geoffrey. *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Helbing, Hanno. "Suchbild der Vergangenheit: Was vom deutschen Geschichtsbuch erwartet wird." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 151-155.

Herold, N. "Kontinuität, historisches." In *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Vol. 4. Ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, 1038-1042. Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1976.

Heuser, Beatrice. "The *Historikerstreit*: Uniqueness and Comparability of the Holocaust." *German History* 6 (April 1988): 69-78.

Hildebrand, Klaus. *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich*. Translated by Anthony Feathergill. London: B.T. Blackford, 1973.

_____. "Geschichte oder 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte'? Die Notwendigkeit einer politischen Geschichtsschreibung von den internationalen Beziehungen." *Historische Zeitschrift* 223 (1976): 328-357.

_____. "Das Zeitalter der Tyrannen: Geschichte und Politik: Die Verwalter der Aufklärung, das Risiko der Wissenschaft und die Geborgenheit der Weltanschauung/Eine Engegung auf Jürgen Habermas." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 174 (31 July 1986), 17.

_____. ed. *Symposium: Wem gehört die deutschen Geschichte? Deutschlands Weg von alten Europa in die europäische Moderne*. Cologne: J. P. Bachem [Hans Martin Schleyer-Stiftung], 1987.

Hillgruber, Andreas. "Politische Geschichte in Moderner Sicht." *Historische Zeitschrift* 216 (1973): 529-552.

_____. *Germany and the Two World Wars*. Translated by William C. Kirby. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

_____. "Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums." in *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht*, 19-27.

"Historikerstreit": Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialischen Judenvernichtung: Texte von Rudolf Augstein, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Martin Broszat, Micha Brumlik, Walter Euchner, Joachim Fest, Helmut Fleischer, Imanuel Geiss, Jürgen Habermas, Hanno Helbing, Klaus Hildebrand, Jürgen Kocka, Robert Leicht, Eberhard Jäckel, Christian Meier, Horst Möller, Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang Mommsen, Thomas Nipperdey, Ernst Nolte, Joachim Perels, Hagen Schulze, Kurt Sontheimer, Michael Stürmer, Heinrich August Winkler. Munich: Piper, 1987.

Hofer, Walter. "Toward a Revision of the German Concept of History." In *German History: Some New German Views*, ed. by Hans Kohn, 187-205. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954.

Hübinger, Paul Egon. "Einleitung." In *Kulturbruch oder Kulturkontinuität im Übergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. by Paul Egon Hübinger, vii-x. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

Huff, Darrell. *How to Lie with Statistics.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1954.

Iggers, Georg. "Deutsche Historiker in der Emigration." In *Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland: Traditionelle Positionen und gegenwärtige Aufgaben*, ed. by Bernd Faulenbach, 97-111. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1974.

_____. *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present.* Revised edition. Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1983.

_____. *New Directions in European Historiography.* Revised edition. Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1984.

_____. "New Directions in Historical Studies in the German Democratic Republic." *History and Theory* 28, no. 1 (1989): 59-77.

Jarausch, Konrad H. "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians." *German Studies Review* 11 (May 1988): 285-301.

Jesse, Eckhard. "Der sogenannte 'Historikerstreit': Ein *deutscher* Streit." In *Der Last der Geschichte: Kontroversen zur deutschen Identität*, ed. by Thomas M. Gauly, 9-54. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1988.

Kehr, Eckart. "Class Struggle and Armament Policy in Imperial Germany." In *Economic Interest, Militarism, Foreign Policy: Essays on German History*, by Eckhart Kehr, ed. with an introduction by Gordon A. Craig, translated by by Grete Heina, 50-75. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914. London: The Ashfield Press, 1980.*

Kershaw, Ian. *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*. 2nd edition. London: Edward Arnold, 1985.

Kocka, Jürgen. "Hitler sollte nicht durch Stalin and Pol Pot verdrängt werden: Über Versuche deutscher Historiker, die Ungeheuerlichkeit von NS-Verbrechen zu relativieren." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 132-42.

Kosiek, Rolf. *Historikerstreit und Geschichtsrevision*. Tübingen: Grabert, 1987.

Kohl, Helmut. "Selbstbestimmung--wie jedes Volk der Erde." An interview conducted by Andreas Hillgruber. In Kühnl, *Vergangenheit*, 107.

Kühnl, Reinhard, ed. *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht: Die 'Historiker-Debatte': Dokumentation, Darstellung und Kritik*. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987.

Laqueur, Walter. *Germany Today: A Personal Report*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985.

Levkov, Ilya, ed., *Bitburg and Beyond: Encounters in American, German and Jewish History*. New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1987.

Lichtman, Allan J. and French, Valerie. *Historians and the Living Past: The Theory and Practice of Historical Study*. Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1978.

Liebel, Helen P. "Philosophical Idealism in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1859-1914." *History and Theory* 3 (1964): 316-330.

_____. "The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1971): 359-385.

Lloyd, Christopher. "The Methodologies of Social History: A Critical Survey and Defense of Structuralism." *History and Theory* 30 (1991): 180-219.

Lozek, Gerhard. "Der Streit geht weiter: Zum Versuch einer apologetische Revision des Faschismusbildes durch

rechtkonservative Historiker der BRD." *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 36 (1988): 5-12.

Mann, Golo. "Plädoyer für die historische Erzählung." In *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, ed. by Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, 40-56. Theorie der Geschichte: Beiträge zur Historik, vol. 3. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979.

Maier, Charles S. *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Meinecke, Friedrich. "Die deutschen Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen." In *Friedrich Meinecke: Werke*. Vol. 8. *Autobiographische Schriften*, edited with an introduction by Eberhard Kessel, 323-445. Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1969.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. "Time in Ancient Historiography." *History and Theory*. Beiheft 6 (1966): 1-23.

Mommsen, Hans. "Haupttendenzen nach 1945 und der Ära des Kalten Kriegs." In *Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland: Traditionelle Positionen und gegenwärtigen Aufgaben*, ed. by Bernd Faulenbach, 112-120. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1974.

_____. "Die Herausfoderung durch die moderen Sozialwissenschaft." In *Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland*, ed. by Bernd Faulenbach, 138-146.

_____. "Historical Scholarship in Transition: The Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany." *Daedalus* 100 (1971): 485-508.

Mommsen, Wilhelm, ed. *Deutsche Parteiprogramme. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*. Vol. 1. Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1960.

Mommsen, Wolfgang J. "Weder Leugnen noch Vergessen befreit von der Vergangenheit: Die Harmonisierung des Geschichtsbildes gefährdet die Freiheit." In *Historikerstreit*, 300-321.

Nipperdey, Thomas. "Wehlers 'Kaiserreich.' Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung." In *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur neuern Geschichte*, by Thomas Nipperdey, 360-389. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1976.

_____. "Kann Geschichte objectiv sein?" In *Nachdenken über die deutschen Geschichte*, by Thomas Nipperdey, 218-234. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1986.

_____. "1933 and the Continuity in German History." In *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. by H.W. Koch, 489-508. London: Macmillan, 1985.

_____. "1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte." In *Nachdenken*, 186-205.

_____. "Unter der Herrschaft des Verdachts: Wissenschaftliche Aussagen dürften nicht an ihren politischen Funktion gemessen werden." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 215-219.

_____. "Wehlers Gesellschaftsgeschichte." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft* 14 (1989): 403-415.

Nolte, Ernst. *Das Vergehen der Vergangenheit: Antwort an meine Kirtiker im sogenannten Historikerstreit*. Berlin: Ullstein, 1987.

_____. "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten konnte." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 39-47.

_____. "Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s." In *Aspects of the Third Reich*, ed. by H. W. Koch, 17-38. London: Macmillan, 1985.

_____. *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

Oakeshott, Michael. "Historical Continuity and Causal Analysis." In *Philosophical Analysis and History*, ed. by William H. Dray, 193-212. Sources in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Frank A. Tillman. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Peukert, Detlev J.K. *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*. Translated by Richard Deveson. London: Penguin, 1989.

Pflanze, Otto. "Bismarcks Herrschaftstechnik als Problem der gegenwärtigen Historiographie." *Historische Zeitschrift* 234 (1982): 561-599.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Vol. 2. *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

_____. *The Poverty of Historicism*. 3d ed. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961.

Pulzer, Peter. *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*. Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Repgen, Konrad. "Der 'Historikerstreit': Einige Anmerkungen zu den aktuellen Veröffentlichen über kontroverse Grundprobleme unserer Geschichte." *Historisches Jahrbuch* 107 (1987): 417-430.

Ritter, Gerhard. *Friedrich der Große: Ein historisches Profil.* Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1936.

Ritter, Henry. *Dictionary of Concepts in History.* Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Röhl, J.C.G. *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History.* Problems and Perspectives in History, ed. Hugh J. Kearney. London: Longman, 1970.

Rosenberg, Hans. *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa.* Publication of the Historischen Kommission zu Berlin beim Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, vol. 24. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967.

Rüsen, Jörn. *Historische Vernunft. Grundzüge einer Historik.* Vol. 1. *Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983.

_____. "Theory of History in the Development of West German Historical Studies: A Reconsideration and Outlook." *German Studies Review* 7 (February 1984): 11-25.

Sauer, Wolfgang. "Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates." In, *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 407-436. Vol. 10 in *Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliotek.* Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966.

Schmidt, W. "Nationalgeschichte der DDR und das territorialstaatliche historische Erbe. *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 29 (1981): 399-404.

Scriven, Michael. "Causes, Connections, and Conditions in History." In, *Philosophical Analysis and History*, ed. William H. Dray, 238-264. Sources in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Frank A. Tillman. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von. *Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart.* Vol. 2. Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1951.

Stadler, Peter. "Rückblick auf eine Historikerstreit--Versuch einer Beurteilung aus nichtdeutscher Sicht." *Historische Zeitschrift* 247 (1988): 15-26.

Stern, Fritz. *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire.* New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

Schreiber, Mathias. "Der wandernde Berg: Aus Anlaß des Streits um die Nationalhymne." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 167 (23 July 1986), 19.

Stürmer, Michael. "Geschichte in geschichtslosen Land." In *"Historikerstreit"*, 36-38.

_____. *Dissonanzen des Fortschritts: Essays über Geschichte und Politik in Deutschland*. Munich: Piper, 1986.

Terhalle, Fritz. "Geschichte der deutschen öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhundrets bis zum Schlusse das zweiten Weltkriegs." Chap. in *Handbuch der Finanzwissenschaft*. Vol. 1. 2d edition. Ed. Wilhelm Gerloff and Fritz Neumark, 273-326. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1952.

Turner, Jr., Henry Ashby. *The Two Germanies since 1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*. Cologne: Kipenheuer & Witch, 1969.

_____. *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918. Studien der deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970.

_____. "Eckart Kehr." In *Deutsche Historiker*. Vol. 1. Ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 100-113. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971.

_____. *Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918*. Deutsche Geschichte, Vol. 9. Ed. Joachim Leuschner. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973.

_____. "Vorwort." In *Sozialgeschichte Heute: Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 9-21. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974.

_____, "Moderne Politikgeschichte oder 'Groβe Politik der Kabinette?". *Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft* 1 (1975): 344-369.

_____. "Kritik und kritische Antikritik." *Historische Zeitschrift* 225 (1977): 347-384.

_____. "Anwendung von Theorie in der Geschichtswissenschaft." In *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, ed. by Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, 17-39. Vol. 3. Theorie der Geschichte: Beiträge zur Historik. Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979.

_____. "Hans Rosenberg." In *Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung. Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft*, by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 267-276. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980.

_____. "Vorwort." In *Historische Sozialwissenschaft*, 7-12.

_____. "Historiography in West Germany." In *Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"*, ed. by Jürgen Habermas, translated by Andrew Buchwalter, 221-259. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984.

_____. *The German Empire 1871-1918*. Translated by Kim Taylor. Leamington Spa, UK: Berg Publishers, 1985.

_____. *Entsorgung der deutsche Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum "Historikerstreit"*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988.

_____. "Alltagsgeschichte: Königsweg zu neuren Ufern oder Irrgarten der Illusionen?". In *Aus der Geschichte lernen? Essays*, by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 130-151. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988.

Weidenfeld, Werner. "Geschichte und Politik." In *Geschichtsbewußtsein der Deutschen: Materialien zur Spurensuche einer Nation*, ed. Werner Wiedenfeld, 13-32. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987.